What are the different perspectives on the likelihood of a recession and what this might mean for equity markets and investors?

Since August of 2022 the Bloomberg consensus has placed a probability of 50% or more on a US recession occurring within the next 12 months. However, despite 525 basis points of tightening and a still hawkish Fed, a soft landing appears increasingly likely. This article from GSFM’s investment partner TD Epoch explains what underpins the US economy’s surprising strength.

Epoch believes there are three reasons why US activity has held up better than expected: the lingering impact of the aggressive COVID stimulus packages, the renaissance of industrial policy (which has led to a manufacturing construction boom), and the still accommodative stance of broader financial conditions.

COVID stimulus drove excess savings

The US response to the COVID recession was fast and furious. As a result, personal income and savings immediately soared (figure one). While this stimulus provided a tremendous impulse for consumption over the last three years, it has by now been entirely spent.

Industrial policy renaissance: booming manufacturing construction

The second reason is that industrial policy has returned, after a fifty-plus year hiatus, with the August 2022 passage of both the $280 billion “Chips and Science Act” and the $400 billion “Inflation Reduction Act” (the latter is horrendously misnamed as it primarily incentivises green technology investment).

One direct beneficiary is manufacturing construction, which is up 101% year-on-year, with the electronics sector especially strong (figure two). Moreover, industrial policy spending is likely to remain robust through 2023, as these expenditures have been approved by Congress.

Overall fiscal spending, for which industrial policy is a component, has provided significant oomph for the economy in 2023, contributing roughly three percentage points of GDP. This has offset much of the Fed’s efforts over the last eighteen months, but fiscal expenditures are set to tighten over the next two years. To illustrate, consensus expects government spending growth to slow from three percent this year to one percent in 2024 and 2025^[1]. This implies a significantly negative fiscal impulse coming down the pipeline.

Overall financial conditions vs the Fed Funds Rate (FFR)

Third, while the FFR has skyrocketed, the same can’t be said of broader financial conditions, which are unchanged compared to July of 2022 (figure three).

To illustrate, the 10 year yield is a bit lower than it was last October and the high yield spread is narrower than its level of a year ago (figure four).

The relatively accommodative stance of overall financial conditions helps explain the resilience of both the consumer and corporates. To illustrate, the US household debt service ratio is only 9.6 percent of income (figure five). This ratio is not only below the 1980-2019 average of 11.2 percent, but beneath the lowest rate hit during that period (9.8 percent).

The situation is even more extreme for US businesses (figure six). Moreover, corporate refinancing needs over the next two years are historically low, reflecting their issuance of so many bonds in 2020 and 2021 when rates were rock bottom. In fact, only 16 percent of corporate debt is slated to mature over the next two years.

However, refinanced corporate debt will pay, on average, an additional 1.5 – 2.0 percentage points above existing rates. This will boost interest expense by around two percent in 2024 and five percent in 2025, and likely have a marginally negative impact on capex, hiring, and so on.

The relatively light interest burden facing consumers and businesses helps explain the surprising strength of the US economy. However, the bad news is this means the Fed needs to maintain a hawkish stance until financial conditions tighten enough to tame hiring, services consumption, and wage growth. 

Will we ever get back to target inflation?

Until this year, the bond market expected the Fed to cut twice to a 4.5 percent policy rate by December 2023 after reaching a peak rate above five percent in June 2023. The Fed has consistently insisted that it would not cut rates this year, but the bond market ignored the message. However, after stellar jobs numbers in early 2023, investors had to concede that rate cuts may not happen until 2024. And after several inflation releases that showed “sticky inflation”, investors began to worry that central banks may never again hit their two percent inflation targets and that we should brace for “higher for longer” rates.

Once US regional bank concerns emerged in March, markets went back to pricing in rate cuts for the second half of 2023. However, this time, investors expected four cuts. Then, after some swift, policy assisted regional bank takeovers, concerns over broader financial contagion dissipated and investors, once again, turned their attention to inflation that has defied expectations by normalising at a “slower than expected” pace. So, today, investors are moving back to pricing out 2023 rate cuts as central banks continue to tighten monetary policy, albeit at a slower pace.

Although the global financial system concerns that have emerged since March certainly add another layer of uncertainty around the future path of inflation, the continued tightening in global monetary policy may seem intuitive based on prevailing inflation levels. However, even before banking stresses came to the forefront, continued rate hikes were surprising when we consider that leading economic indicators have been signalling that a recession is coming. But is it?

Three scenarios for the next 12 months

With wage growth still over five percent and core inflation north of four percent, Epoch expects the Fed to retain a tightening bias for at least the next two quarters. While so much tightening, over such a short period, would normally have ensured a recession, nothing about this cycle has been normal. Moreover, forecasting nonlinear events like recessions is a mug’s game. That is why Epoch advocates humility and has adopted a scenario- based framework.

Investors always price in a soft landing (and occasionally they’re correct)

The first scenario calls for a soft landing (50 percent probability), similar to the experiences in 1984 and 1995. This scenario appears to be the current market consensus, which is not unusual as investors always expect a soft landing when the Fed is nearly done tightening.

A soft landing implies sub-trend but positive GDP growth, inflation stuck at three percent, a hawkish pause from the Fed and EPS growing by mid-single digits. This scenario also suggests a choppy S&P500, with “fat and flat” (i.e. choppy but directionless) equity returns. Previous soft landings were terrific for equities, but this time valuations are already quite stretched, which is likely to put a cap on further upside.

The second outcome involves a “short and shallow” recession (40 percent likely), with slightly negative GDP growth, inflation decelerating below three percent, Fed cuts of 200-300 basis points and EPS declining by five-to-ten percent, but recovering quickly, within a couple quarters. For equity markets, this could be similar to the 1990 recession in which the S&P500 declined sharply for two months, but then experienced an impressive V-shaped recovery.

When the Fed hits the brakes, someone almost always goes through the windshield. The third scenario is a hard landing (10 percent chance), in which something breaks, creating a credit event that cascades across financial linkages and results in a freezing of funding markets. This is what happened on a massive scale in 2000-2002 and 2007-2009, although this time the imbalances are much less extreme (figure seven).

In a hard landing, GDP growth would be negative for an extended period of time, and EPS would slump by well over 15 percent. In such an outcome, the Fed would be focused on financial stability rather than inflation and would quickly slash rates (by over 300 basis points). Equity markets could plummet by 15-30 percent, with a relatively slow L-shaped recovery.

While it is extremely difficult to know which of the three scenarios is unfolding, we believe there are four key recession indicators to watch like a hawk:

1. The Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey, which is already close to recessionary levels and implies much weaker consumer and commercial and industrial lending, as well as dramatically wider high yield spreads and significantly negative capex growth.
2. The non-performing loans exposure of small banks, which account for 68 percent of commercial real estate loans (but only 38 percent of overall lending).
3. Default rates on high yield and leveraged loans, which have inched up to 2019 levels but aren’t yet anywhere near levels consistent with a recession.
4. Consumer delinquencies, as they are creeping higher, especially for auto loans and credit cards.

Investment implications

The US economy has been much more resilient this year than consensus had expected. However, most of the reasons for this surprising strength are fading. Moreover, the economy’s durability has forced the Fed to maintain a hawkish stance, to ensure inflationary pressures don’t reassert themselves.

It is also critical to keep in mind that monetary policy works with a lag that is famously long and variable. The Fed just started hiking 17 months ago and in previous cycles it has taken considerably longer (typically 21 to 42 months) for the tightening to bite. This suggests the possibility that the current cycle might not be that different, it’s just that the federal funds rate is a crude tool and takes a long time to produce its desired effect.

Epoch believes a short and shallow recession is 40 percent likely and assigns a 10 percent probability to a hard landing. However, it is impossible to have high conviction regarding the timing and depth of an eventual downturn. Rather, the scenario-based approach is preferred, one which favours a cautious stance, focused on quality companies with a demonstrated ability to return capital to shareholders and/or to produce a return on invested capital in excess of their cost of capital.

By William Priest, CFA, Executive Chairman & Co-Chief Investment Officer, and Kevin Hebner, PhD, Managing Director, Global Investment Strategist, Epoch

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[1] This reflects the 3 June “Fiscal Responsibility Act”, part of the debt limit deal, which sets a cap on federal discretionary spending for 2024 and 2025

Important information: The information included in this article is provided for informational purposes only. The information contained in this article reflects, as of the date of publication, the current opinion of Epoch Investment Partners, Inc (Epoch) and is subject to change without notice. Sources for the material contained in this article are deemed reliable but cannot be guaranteed. We do not represent that this information is accurate and complete, and it should not be relied upon as such. Any opinions expressed in this material reflect our judgment at this date, are subject to change and should not be relied upon as the basis of your investment decisions. All reasonable care has been taken in producing the information set out in this article however subsequent changes in circumstances may occur at any time and may impact on the accuracy of the information. Neither Epoch, GSFM Pty Ltd, their related bodies nor associates gives any warranty nor makes any representation nor accepts responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in this article.

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William Priest

The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 was a gigantic worldwide liquidity crisis that morphed into a recession but was largely treatable by monetary policy with fiscal support. Novel monetary and fiscal solutions, Quantitative Easing (QE) and the Targeted Asset Repurchase Program (TARP) in particular were put into place in the U.S.

QE was used initially to solve the overwhelming illiquidity issue of the moment. No free market solution would have worked without untold misery of unemployment and bankruptcies. The banking system could not have survived. Our federal government purchased certain assets that were killing private sector holders because of their illiquidity and placed those securities on a balance sheet that possessed an infinite maturity—that of the federal government. These policies worked, and the U.S. taxpayer even made a profit on TARP holdings.

In my 50 years of working in finance, it was the most terrifying moment I had ever experienced. The world as we knew it could have imploded. But it did not thanks to the mixture of TARP and QE.

The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 is a very different situation. From an economic perspective, we are facing a huge demand shock, not a financial liquidity shock. Without an offset, we will then face a supply shock as unemployment rises and productive measures crumble. This important difference from 2008 must be solved with fiscal policy and not monetary policy. The latter cannot address the problem we face today. For one thing it comes at a time when corporate balance sheets are highly leveraged relative to their past and the global manufacturing base was already flirting with recession as reflected in global manufacturing PMIs.

COVID-19 has produced a huge demand shock at the same time in which we have entered a new cold war with China, supply chains are being deglobalized, and the labor arbitrage that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 has run its course. Profit margins were peaking, manufacturing PMIs were falling and corporate debt leverage was touching new highs.

As we begin to grasp both the human and economic consequences of this pandemic, the demand shock is increasingly evident. A recession is inevitable when one considers the forces in motion and only fiscal policy can address the broadening consequences of this exploding demand shock.

Think of COVID-19 as a point on an “S” curve. Early on, the incidence of the virus expands as it rides up the S curve. Every data point is higher and the rate of change is increasing as well. At some level, we reach an inflection point. After that, the curve continues to rise but at a decreasing rate before it reaches an asymptotic state (think flat).

We still do not have a good picture of where we are on the “S” curve globally. China and South Korea appear to have passed the inflection point but that does not appear to be the case elsewhere. The key is to hit the inflection point as soon as possible and hope that we can bend the curve to something close to flat. Think of the letter “L” upside down. Achieving that will require significant social distancing now and eventually a vaccine.

The faster we flatten the line, the better for our health, but actions taken to do just that will worsen the economic outlook. This is why we need fiscal stimulus, and it will have to be big. Only the federal government can deal with this problem in order to minimize the length of any economic slowdown. We must offset the demand shock arising from the “treatments” (primarily social distancing policies) required to eliminate the virus.

Consider the following model. It is something we have used in the past to demonstrate the linkage between the real economy and the financial economy. The links between the two economies are shown below.

Real GDP is the sum of the levels of employment and productivity. The growth rate is the sum of the growth rate of the work force plus the growth rate of productivity. Add inflation to that number and you have nominal GDP.

If one holds profit margins constant, the growth rate of nominal GDP tends to equal the growth in corporate earnings over long periods of time. The valuation metric for those earnings (think P/E) is largely driven by the inflation rate as reflected through interest rates. The absence of inflation would cause one to use what economists call a “normal” interest rate.

Here is where a lot of things changed during the last decade. QE dropped or even eliminated the “normal” rate, causing the present value of financial assets to soar. The idea was that the higher level of financial asset values would induce higher GDP because higher wealth combined with the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) would accelerate growth in employment and productivity and lead to overall GDP growth accelerating. While it was helpful to the economy, even if not to the degree that was hoped for, it was fabulous for financial asset valuations.

Now, let’s look at the model through the lens of the demand shock induced by COVID-19. Services represent more than 50% of the U.S. economy, and services require human interaction. Social distancing will impair that activity and eventually result in lower employment and productivity. As these components decline, so will real GDP, leading inevitably to a recession.

Monetary policy cannot address this problem, but fiscal policy can. The “G” component in the C + I + G + (X-M) = GNP equation must be expanded a great deal. Only fiscal policy can accomplish this end. For the U.S., a badly needed infrastructure stimulus could be put into place. With Treasury rates at all-time lows, it would be easy to finance. (Yes, we would be adding to the “debt mountain,” but let’s hold that issue for the moment.) There are two big sources of demand for the debt issuance: foreigners and the Social Security System regardless of the low rate levels that exist at the moment. (That argument will be presented in a future paper).

If the only tool we use is monetary policy it will fail badly. The demand shock will lead to a supply shock as unemployment rises and productivity falls. One must use fiscal policy to solve this problem even if means mailing a check to households every month who are suddenly left without income earners because of the shock emanating from the social distancing policies required to defeat biological effects of the virus.

The Fed has cut rates to zero, but it will not be enough. If fiscal policy is deployed in a timely (now) and efficient manner, the future shape of the economy can look more like the letter “V” than the letters “U” or “L.” The equity markets will reflect that shape as well.

By William W. Priest, CFA , Chief Executive Officer, Co-Chief Investment Officer & Portfolio Manager

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On an October Sunday many years ago, when my family lived in the leafy New York suburb of Union County, New Jersey, I was driving to a civic event, and likely to arrive a bit late. I started to make the left turn into the parking lot, but to see just how late I might be, I glanced to my right to see if people were still waiting outside the building. Thus distracted, I banged into a large bucket filled with concrete, holding a sign that prominently read: “NO LEFT TURN ON SUNDAYS.” A traffic cop, a very good-natured one, slowly walked my way and asked, “How big a sign do you need, fella?”

That moment comes back to me when I observe strange situations, with flashing red lights and other “danger ahead” signals that no one seems to notice. Today’s markets present two such prominent signs, which lead us to draw up a sign of our own, on the debate over the merits of passive investing.

We start with a comment from James Grant, published in the May 15th issue of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer. “Great bond bull markets don’t come around all the time,” he notes: “In fact, there have only been three in America over 150 years — 1865 to 1900, 1920 to 1946, and 1981 to the present.”

In words too precious to paraphrase, he states: “In the nature of things, bull markets end at extremes of valuation…marked by the metallic scraping sounds of conservative fiduciaries searching for suitable income-producing investments in the bottoms of barrels… In no previous modern interest-rate cycle did short-dated sovereign yields make their lows at less than zero or the 10-year German Bund touch its low at just five basis points above zero.”

To which we add — in the lingo of traders — if this pricing is not nuts, it is certainly abnormal, and qualifies as a “danger ahead” sign (Figure 1 below).

Grant illustrates with a case study on the dangers, ex-post, of reaching for high yield in a market of zero interest rates:

“On the systemic mispricing of debt”^[1] – How a $50 million loan to RadioShack turned into an $81 million gross impairment was the featured topic on the May 7th earnings call of Fidelity & Guaranty Life of Des Moines, Iowa (FGL on the Big Board).

Stage one was that $50 million plain-vanilla credit, the company explained. Stage two involved a $63 million equity tranche in a collateralised loan obligation, of which a certain portion was invested in RadioShack debt — nothing vanilla here.

Stage three concerned a $33 million investment in a reinsurance vehicle that also came equipped with RadioShack exposure. Diallers-in listened as chief financial officer, Dennis Vigneau, summed things up.

“Following extensive evaluation analysis…,” said Vigneau, “the $50 million loan participation was impaired by $35 million, or 70% to a fair value of $15 million. Next, the $63 million CLO investment, which was partially exposed to RadioShack, was impaired by $25 million, or approximately 40%, to a fair value of $38 million. And lastly, the $33 million preferred stock investment… was impaired by $21 million, or 64%, to a fair value of $12 million. In total, these impairments were $81 million gross….”

Fidelity & Guaranty Life, an off-shoot of the old U.S.F. & G., of Baltimore, is the firm that “helps middle-income Americans prepare for retirement,” or so claim its copywriters. If so, the life insurer’s investment department, with its RadioShack trifecta, itself needs help. Certainly, it gets none from the world’s central banks — or, as far as that goes, from the post-1981 interest-rate zeitgeist.

The second danger sign comes to us from the fast lane of the equity markets – a broker’s research note to which financial history may assign the label “What were they thinking?” (Readers over 50 years of age will likely nod in agreement with our assessment; those under 30 may think we are nuts.)

Tesla Motors, a maker of high-priced electric sports cars, shows no current profits – a trend its management seems confident will continue through this decade. Hungry markets have nonetheless handed over huge sums to finance Tesla’s hungry operations, including an August equity offering for over $700 million^[2], after debt and equity sales in May 2013 of about $1 billion.^[3]

In response to the first quarter 2015 earnings conference call of Tesla Motors, Adam Jonas, Morgan Stanley’s chief analyst of the industry now known as “Autos and Shared Mobility,” doubled down on his overweight opinion on the stock, and posted a price target of $280 per share (versus its price then of $237, and $260 on September 17th). Pay special attention to one line bolded at the end of the first paragraph.

…If we were to go back in time two years and tell you that in 2015 Tesla would be burning nearly $1.5 billion of cash and have all but ruled out GAAP profitability before 2020, we might have forgiven you if you thought the stock could be well below $100/share…Elon and the team may be getting by on monetizing the imagination of the investment community. But the thing some may be underestimating is: Imagination is real.

…Demand for Tesla’s stationary storage products has been “crazy off the hook” in the first five days following the introduction. These products may not have any meaningful contribution to Tesla’s revenue for at least two or three years – but this may not stop analysts from attributing many billions of dollars to the company’s long-term valuation…

…It is clear to us that there is nearly a uniform acceptance of the situation and a calmness and confidence around the company’s ability to address cash needs…

…Cash burn of $558mm… was well above our forecast of $330mm of burn in the quarter… with the rest due to a substantial rise in working capital including rising in-process inventory. The inventory rise may need further explanation to investors who could equate the development with slowing demand for Model S…

…A successful launch/ramp [of the Model X] into 4Q can make a very significant difference in determining whether Tesla burns $1bn this year (we think a best case) or more than $1.5bn this year (a bear case). In any case, we believe Tesla may find a capital intervention desirable if not absolutely necessary…

…We’d strongly advise investors to take down 4Q and full year deliveries to allow for greater execution risk for Model X…

…Easily two thirds of the call was devoted to Tesla energy, Powerwall, and the stationary storage opportunity. This is great, but it potentially masks some very important up-front liquidity needs of the company that investors will want to pay very close attention to…^[4]

Tesla Motors may have ambitious plans, but behind this buy recommendation lies a company with enormous cash flow challenges, both present and future. The greatest support the analyst seems to have for his bullish case is that “Imagination is real.” He must be kidding us. Cash flow is real; one cannot spend imagination.

Returning to James Grant, he states: “The mispricing of biotech stocks or corn and soybeans is of no great consequence to financial at large. Interest rates are another matter. Universal prices, they discount future cash flows, calibrate risk and define investment hurdle rates. Interest rates are the traffic signals of a market economy… and since 2008, they have mainly been green.”^[5]

Seven years of low interest rates have heavily influenced corporations’ capital allocation. Recall that there are only five possible uses of free cash flow, and they can be placed into two buckets — capital reinvestment and capital returned to shareholders.

Cash dividends, share buybacks, and debt repayments are all forms of the latter. Low interest rates encourage corporations to borrow and apply the proceeds to buy back shares — an opportunity that prudent managements should take advantage of, assuming the rate math works and they lack promising projects to invest in.

Accordingly, this year’s share buybacks and cash dividends of US corporations will likely exceed $1 trillion — over 6% of US GDP. Merger and acquisition activity is startlingly high as well: through September 18, the value of global deals over $10 billion reached $1.19 trillion, surpassing the previous record set during the internet bubble in 1999.^[6]

The parade of M&A activity will surprise everyone as this year winds up, pushed to such heights by our central bankers (many of whom are on the short lists to join banks and investment firms, after completing their tours of “responsible duty”).

Now we turn to a story of low interest rates with what we expect will be a more constructive outcome. Consider the August acquisition of Pall Corporation, a maker of filtration products, by technology company Danaher Corporation. On the surface, Danaher paid what appeared a ridiculously high price, but seen through the lens of its cost of capital, their decision is likely to have a very positive outcome.

Danaher estimated its marginal cost of capital for this acquisition to be around 2%, and anticipated the prospective return of the acquisition to approximate 9%. Thus this deal is accretive to the firm’s valuation for the incremental return on the capital deployed exceeds the firm’s marginal cost of capital. This transaction extends Danaher’s outstanding record of value-enhancing acquisitions.

Stories of high-yield train wrecks and buy recommendations founded on imagination bring us to our own warning sign, regarding passive investing. More than half of the return of the S&P 500 for the three years ending in December 2014, and more than 75% of the return to the MSCI World index, were brought about by an expansion in price-earnings ratios, rather than increases in earnings or cash flow. And what was the force pushing those valuations higher? Low interest rates fuelled largely by quantitative easing, of course.

We drive our stake into the ground. We at Epoch are firm believers in active investment, because our clients have won over time, in terms of both total return and risk-adjusted return. With the global economy faltering once again, the markets may be about to enter another one of those periods where stock selection is crucial, and naysayers on the value of active management may see their passive portfolios underperform for a while, perhaps substantially.

Understanding the principles of capital allocation, and finding the winning firms that know how to create shareholder value, will win. Knowing where the potholes lie will be even more valuable in a difficult market.

Now, it’s probably not fair to condemn all of passive investing with two extremes-of-the-markets anecdotes like RadioShack and Tesla. (And at the moment, only Tesla is in the Russell 1000; RadioShack is off the radar.)

But keep in mind the basic principle of indexing: an investor has a bit of every company, irrespective of its fundamentals. Case in point: at the end of August, in the MSCI USA Investable Market Index, which includes the 2,500 largest US stocks, 18% of companies had shown negative earnings per share for the latest twelve months. (That’s after a fairly long economic expansion, when companies should be looking their best.)

Through indexing an investor can wind up owning a lot of undesirable names which an active manager would be likely to screen out. My partner and co-CIO David Pearl states a simple truth: “A company with little or no debt that generates free cash flow each and every year cannot go broke.”

However, “broke” will be embedded in the future of those passive strategies that invest in everything under the sun – including the effects of QE in the search for yield, and the level of the market’s “imagination.”

Notwithstanding the Fed’s decision to wait on raising interest rates, P/E ratios are likely to retrace some of their rise in the 2012-2014 period, reflecting slower global growth and/ or eventually a rise in interest rates. Investors will need more than just passive management strategies to stay ahead.

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^[1] Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, Vol. 33, No. 10, May 15, 2015.

^[2] “Tesla’s tally from stock offering: $738.3 million,” MarketWatch, August 19, 2015

^[3] “Tesla Motors raises more than $1 billion from debt, equity,” Reuters, May 17, 2013

^[4] Tesla Motors Inc: ‘Off the Hook’: More Money, More Spending, More TAM, Morgan Stanley, May 11, 2015

^[5] Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, Vol. 33, No. 10, May 15, 2015.

^[6] “Value of megadeals this year beats dotcom-boom record to reach $1.2 trillion.” Financial Times, September 19, 2015.

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The information included in this article is provided for informational purposes only. The information contained in this article reflects, as of the date of publication, the current opinion of Epoch Investment Partners and is subject to change without notice. Sources for the material contained in this article are deemed reliable but cannot be guaranteed. We do not represent that this information is accurate and complete, and it should not be relied upon as such. Any opinions expressed in this material reflect our judgment at this date, are subject to change and should not be relied upon as the basis of your investment decisions. All reasonable care has been taken in producing the information set out in this article however subsequent changes in circumstances may occur at any time and may impact on the accuracy of the information. Neither Epoch Investment Partners, Grant Samuel Funds Management, their related bodies nor associates gives any warranty nor makes any representation nor accepts responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in this article. ©2015 Epoch Investment Partners.

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