For advisers, AI is rapidly moving from an experimentation phase to core advice infrastructure, and regulators are making it clear that governance expectations must keep pace.

Regulator scrutiny of AI governance just got serious

In years to come, they may well call it the ‘Mythos effect’ – the point in early 2026 where all the concerns about AI use in financial services came to a head and prompted the regulators to get serious.

ASIC has been watching this issue particularly closely since October 2024, when it published Report 798^[1], an examination of AI governance practices across financial services licensees. But when Anthropic (the company behind ‘Claude’) began inviting selected organisations to trial Mythos^[2] – a model built specifically for cybersecurity and autonomous coding – regulator anxiety shifted to a whole new level. Within weeks, ASIC had issued an urgent call^[3] for cyber uplift in the face of agentic AI, and APRA had written^[4] to all regulated entities demanding a ‘step change’ in AI risk management, warning that governance practices were falling dangerously behind the pace of advancements.

For advisers, the rapid adoption of AI gives this scrutiny extra relevance. A recent survey^[5] found that 74% of Australian advisers are already using or planning to use AI in their business – well ahead of the global average of 64% – with practices already putting AI to work drafting file notes, generating statements of advice and client communications, and accelerating research and compliance tasks.

For readers, this article takes a timely and practical look the nature of AI risks, the extent to which existing compliance frameworks and obligations acknowledge these risks, and what you can do now to close the governance gap and protect yourself and your clients.

AI is rapidly becoming advicetech infrastructure

The increasing adoption of AI by advisers has seen it rapidly progress from being an add-on tool to becoming a central element underpinning the technology stacks of advice practices.

The 2025 Adviser Landscape Report^[6] identified the key areas practices were already applying AI:

• 86% were using it for file notes and meeting documentation
• 53% were using it for client engagement applications such as newsletters
• 48% were using it for marketing, and
• 46% were using it with SOA or ROA production.

Given these rates are based on 2025 data, they are almost certainly higher now, as is the number of AI systems being used by advisers.

AI no longer just means ‘ChatGPT’, as advisers are presented with an ever-growing choice of generative AI tools developed specifically for advice, including Paradino, Saturn, and Marloo. At the same time, platforms and CRMs including Iress XPlan and Netwealth are rushing to offer various degrees of AI functionality, while the ubiquitous Microsoft 365 platform includes the rapidly improving Copilot.

The more innovative firms within the advice ecosystem are already pushing into more sophisticated territory. Melbourne-based Yarra Lane, working with outsourcing specialist Vital Business Partners, has been running AI-assisted workflow automation that literally goes to work overnight: bots review adviser calendars, access client systems, download portfolio reports and stage everything in SharePoint so advisers are ready to go before the first meeting of the day. As CEO Nick Perrett summed up, “our planners are working throughout the day, and our bots go to work at night.”^[7]

The next evolution will be ‘agentic AI’ – systems capable not just of automating fixed tasks, but of reasoning, making decisions and adapting when circumstances change, all without constant human direction. While still in its nascency within advice, the lightning pace of change, and the enthusiasm many advisers have for new technology, will likely drive a very sharp adoption curve.

But its power creates governance challenges

The power of AI to transform financial advice is already beyond doubt. Terry Dillon, Chief Executive of Shadforth Financial, expects his advisers to see 50 per cent-plus more clients thanks to AI, without dropping the amount of client contact or the quality of the advice.

“We’re not talking incremental change. We’re talking a step change in the number of clients advisers will be able to see over time,” Dillon says^[8].

As well as speed, AI can be consistent at scale, reducing the variability that can occur across different staff members or even across different decisions by the same team member.

Entireti’s Neil Younger argues this consistency “means you’re starting to introduce advice at lower cost points than we see in the traditional model.”^[9]

But this scalability and power is a double-edged sword. Any flaw in the AI, whether it be a hallucination, an algorithmic bias, or inadequate personalisation, can be propagated across hundreds of client files before anyone realises.

And the unseen nature of some AI tools – which run in the background of more comprehensive systems, rather than being standalone – can amplify the governance challenges.

ASIC’s central finding from REP 798^[10] is that these risks are real and growing, and businesses are struggling to ensure their governance practices can keep up with the explosive pace of change.

What ASIC found in Rep 798

ASIC’s Report 798 was based on a review of 624 AI use cases across 23 licensees, including banks, credit providers, insurers and financial advice businesses. What they found was that governance frameworks put in place by many of these businesses were failing to evolve at the same speed as the technology.

More alarming was the observed variability in standards – while some licensees had documented strategies and board-level reporting, others had no AI specific policies or governance framework at all.  Among the specific findings:

• Only 12 of the 23 licensees had policies addressing fairness or bias in their AI systems
• Only 10 had any documented approach to disclosing AI use to consumers
• None had implemented ‘contestability’ arrangements (mechanisms allowing clients to challenge decisions in which AI had played a role)
• 30% of all use cases relied on third-party AI models, and many licensees could not explain what those models were actually doing.

ASIC illustrated the practical implications of these governance shortcomings with a powerful, real life case study : a credit scoring model that had been running for months with no governance documentation, no risk rating and where the provider “could not explain the variables in the scorecard or the impact they are having on an applicant’s score.”^[11]

It is easy to imagine the same sort of ‘black box’ scenario in risk profiling software, which, if some unknown error or bias crept in, could allocate erroneous risk profiles to clients, undetected, for a significant period of time, potentially opening those clients up to significant financial harm.

Cyber risks take centre stage

While AI related cyber risks received little focus in Rep 798 (being mentioned only twice), the ‘Mythos effect’ has seen the topic become much more prominent in ASIC’s recent thinking, culminating in their May 2026 call for ‘cyber uplift’.

In an open letter^[12] from Commissioner Simone Constant, ASIC noted:

“The rapid evolution of frontier artificial intelligence models marks a significant shift in the cyber threat landscape. These models are accelerating both capability and accessibility, lowering the barrier to sophisticated cyber activity, increasing the speed and scale of attacks, and enabling new forms of exploitation that were previously out of reach for most actors.”

“This is not a distant or hypothetical risk. It is here now, evolving quickly and requires the attention of boards and executives.”

While ASIC weren’t targeting one specific industry sector with this message, the sensitive nature of client data stored and used by financial advisers makes advice firms an attractive target for ‘bad actors’, giving this statement added resonance for the advice profession.

In particular, it forces AFSLs to reckon with a problem not previously factored into most AI governance thinking – the extent to which AI dramatically expands the “attack surfaces” (exposure to untrusted networks).

When client data is fed into third-party AI tools, for example to generate file notes, draft SOAs, or summarise meeting transcripts, it is leaving the firm’s ‘controlled’ environment. The data handling practices of the AI vendor and the security of the API connection become a critical part of the firm’s cyber risk profile. The more vendors used, the bigger the attack surface.

APRA puts all regulated entities on notice

During a targeted review of large banks, insurers and superannuation trustees in late 2025, APRA identified a number of gaps which echoed those uncovered in Rep 798, including cyber security, governance maturity, and third-party concentration.

Following their review, APRA wrote to all regulated entities in April 2026 warning that while AI adoption is accelerating across the sector, associated governance and risk management practices are not keeping up^[13]. Boards were singled out as needing to develop the ability to challenge AI-related risks and ask hard questions of management.

AI governance – advisers’ existing obligations

ASIC frequently makes the point that the law, and its associated guidance, is ‘technology neutral’. This makes it easier for the regulatory framework to adapt to unforeseen technological advancements (video SOAs anyone?), and also means advisers have a base level of compliance obligations that apply regardless of the technologies used.

Key examples of obligations that are directly relevant to the use of AI in advice include (but are not limited to):

• Providing services “Efficiently, honestly and fairly” (under s912A)
  • You can’t blame an AI tool for incorrect outputs
• Not making “False and misleading representations” (under Australian Consumer Law)
  • AI hallucinations remain a significant risk
• Best Interests Duty
  • Professional reasoning cannot be delegated to a model
• Record keeping
  • The same evidentiary standards apply to AI generated file notes as to human generated documents.

A practical adviser framework for AI governance

In addition to the foundational compliance obligations that apply regardless of the technology used, the governance questions included by ASIC in Report 798 are a valuable starting point when building a practical, AI specific, governance framework for advisers.

An example of such a framework is below:

• Do an AI inventory check
  It is crucial to understand where AI exists in your practice. Start with a simple inventory: every AI tool in use, what it does, who is accountable for it, and what client data it touches. Include tools embedded in CRMs and wealth platforms, not just standalone AI applications.

• Have a documented AI policy
  At some stage, it is likely that having a documented AI policy will be mandatory, so get ahead of the curve. Your policy should cover:

• • which AI tools are approved for use and for what purposes?
  • what AI tools are not permitted (particularly for client-facing outputs without human review)?
  • what data may and may not be input into AI tools?
  • what review is required before AI-generated content is relied upon or sent to clients?
  • what client information is being fed into AI tools?
  • who stores those prompts, and what are the privacy implications?

• Assign accountability
  Someone in the practice needs to own AI governance. In a small practice this may be the principal adviser. In a larger licensee it may require a formal role or committee. ASIC’s May 2026 cyber statement is explicit that this responsibility sits at board and leadership level.

• Conduct meaningful human oversight
  Having genuine human oversight of AI output – often referred to as ‘Human in the loop’ – means the adviser can stand behind every recommendation in the document, explain the reasoning, and confirm it reflects the specific client’s circumstances. Anything short of this means such oversight doesn’t really exist.
• Train your staff on the tools they use
  The black box phenomenon, where no one really understands how AI is generating the answers it does, is clearly dangerous. Staff need to understand what each AI tool does, what it can get wrong, and where their judgement needs to take over.
• Make your vendors accountable too
  Most AI powered software is provided by a third party, and you need to be comfortable about their own governance standards. Find out from the vendor what model they provide to you, how it is trained and updated, how errors are identified and corrected, and what happens to client data entered into the system. 

• Address cyber risk specifically
  ASIC’s May 2026 letter placed active management of third-party cyber risk squarely on the licensee. Review which AI tools are receiving client data and under what terms. Assess vendor security practices and data handling as part of your outsourcing governance.
• Tell your clients where you have used AI
  There is currently no mandatory requirement to disclose AI use to clients in the advice context. But Rep 798 flags this as an area of emerging expectation, and voluntary disclosure is now better practice. Consumers have a growing expectation that AI is used by businesses and indeed may even use AI to critique your recommendations. Providing a brief, plain-language explanation of where AI is used in the advice process can protect you and the client down the track.
• Build in regular reviews
  AI vendors can update models, add capabilities and change data handling practices at breathtaking speed. The governance framework you put in place today will likely date faster than almost any other document in your business, meaning regular reviews are critical.

In summary

For advisers, AI is rapidly moving from an experimentation phase to core advice infrastructure, and regulators are making it clear that governance expectations must keep pace. Recent interventions from APRA and ASIC – for which new ‘frontier’ and agentic AI systems were the catalyst – signal that improving AI oversight is something for entities of all sizes to prioritise now.

For advisers, the challenge is not whether AI should be used, but how it can be used in a way that remains defensible and consistent with existing professional obligations. Practices that treat AI governance as an extension of their broader compliance and client protection frameworks will be better positioned to capture the transformative benefits of the technology, while avoiding the governance failures regulators are increasingly worried about.

Take the FAAA accredited quiz to earn 0.25 CPD hour:

CPD Quiz

The following CPD quiz is accredited by the FAAA at 0.25 hour.

Legislated CPD Area: Regulatory Compliance & Consumer Protection (0.25 hrs)

ASIC Knowledge Requirements: Regulatory Environment (0.25 hrs)

please log in to start this quiz

———–

References:
[1] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/mtllqjo0/rep-798-published-29-october-2024.pdf
[2] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-04-23/powerful-ai-tools-posing-cybersecurity-risks-australia-lagging/106584436
[3] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2026-releases/26-092mr-asic-calls-for-urgent-cyber-uplift-as-ai-accelerates-cyber-threats/
[4] https://www.apra.gov.au/news-and-publications/apra-calls-for-a-step-change-ai-related-risk-management-and-governance
[5] https://www.adviserratings.com.au/news/the-ai-revolution-in-financial-advice-australian-practices-leading-global-adoption/
[6] Ibid
[7] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2025/05/meet-the-advisers-pioneering-the-professions-ai-adoption/
[8] https://www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/the-biggest-constraint-to-using-ai-for-financial-advisers-20260407-p5zltj
[9] Ibid
[10] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/mtllqjo0/rep-798-published-29-october-2024.pdf
[11] Ibid
[12] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/xhrf1w0e/26-092mr-open-letter-to-afs-licensees-and-market-participants.pdf
[13] https://www.apra.gov.au/apra-letter-to-industry-on-artificial-intelligence-ai

The post CPD: AI governance – a practical framework for advisers appeared first on AdviserVoice.

Switching advice must be supported by a clear rationale, grounded in the client’s best interests and able to demonstrate a net benefit after fees.

Superannuation switching – so hot right now

Superannuation switching is arguably the hottest topic in financial advice right now.

It is at the centre of narratives around high-profile advice and product failures, changes to the Compensation Scheme of Last Resort (CSLR), the evolving landscape of competitive superannuation flows, and regulatory reform priorities. It is the subject of a very public battle between advocates for industry funds and retail providers, and it has fuelled widespread coverage through both trade and mainstream media.

The potential for consumer harm from inappropriate switching was already on ASIC’s radar following the release of Rep 781 in 2024^[1], and recently heightened regulatory and policymaker scrutiny has culminated in the April 2026 release of Treasury consultations^[2] on proposed reforms impacting super switching and lead generation.

This article examines the key dynamics within this issue, including the drivers of increased switching and the consumer risks identified by regulators. It also frames potential regulatory outcomes and suggests practical steps advisers can take to ensure their switching advice remains compliant and robust in the face of likely reforms.

Super switching is big business

To truly understand why superannuation switching is now receiving so much media attention and regulatory focus, it is necessary to appreciate the broader industry context around superannuation flows and retirement trends.

The compulsory nature of Australia’s superannuation system has underpinned its remarkable growth. As the superannuation savings pool has grown (it now exceeds $4.5 trillion^[3]), it has collided with our ageing population to create a ‘silver tsunami’ of Australians who are retiring with (1) higher superannuation balances than ever before, and (2) more need for advice to navigate an increasingly complex retirement income system.

The combination of these forces has in turn driven an increase in switching activity between funds. Some of this switching is self-directed, as members are forced out of funds failing the APRA performance test, or as they heed messages about fund consolidation to reduce fees. Other switching is driven by advisers seeking to place their clients in funds offering better performance, wider options, more responsive service and greater transparency.

In the case of advisers, many are finding the superannuation offerings of leading retail platforms to be superior to many large incumbent funds, powering a flow of funds away from legacy master trusts and industry funds. The 2026 State of Super report^[4] from the Conexus Institute, alongside various media reports, speaks to the scale of this trend, and provides a more precise view of how these flows are occurring.

The report estimates that around $40b of switching activity – or approximately 52% – involved a financial adviser, with a significant proportion of switches directed toward leading retail platforms including Hub24 and Netwealth. At the same time, several large industry funds, including Australian Super, ART, HESTA, and Rest, are experiencing competitive net outflows, as are for-profit master trusts including AMP Super, Insignia, and Mercer.

The potential for adverse switching outcomes was already on ASIC’s radar

As the size of the superannuation pool increases, so too does the number of businesses attracted to the sector and its revenue potential. Sadly, not all these businesses will be compliant and customer focused, a point which has been recognised by ASIC for some time, and which was reinforced by their review of superannuation trustee practices, published as Report 781^[5].

Released in May 2024, ASIC’s Report 781 identified a range of concerns, including in relation to advice fee deductions and harmful switching activities, particularly where member balances were eroded by inappropriate advice charges.

The report specifically highlighted the role of “high-pressure, cold calling for superannuation switching business models”, noting that these practices were associated with:

• unnecessary, generic or inappropriate advice
• switching into unsuitable superannuation products
•  poorer retirement outcomes for members.

ASIC identifies poor conduct by advisers and licensees as central to consumer harm. However, it also made clear that the way trustees oversee advice fee deductions can either mitigate or allow these risks to persist.

Such oversight could include

• proactive checks of advice documents
• the use of appropriate fee caps and
• consent controls and more active monitoring of advisers and licensees.

Recent high profile fund failures are the catalyst for even more scrutiny

Two recent high-profile fund failures^[6] have proved to be the catalyst for further heightened regulator and media scrutiny of superannuation switching practices.

A central feature of these failures was the role of lead generators in identifying and targeting prospective clients, often through cold-calling or digital acquisition strategies, and encouraging them to switch into higher-risk investment structures with the promise of superior returns. In many cases, these interactions formed part of a broader distribution chain involving marketing firms, referral partners and authorised representatives.

These third-party lead generation models typically attract consumer interest through offers such as a ‘free super health check’, retirement readiness tools or comparison-style calculators. While these gamified propositions can appear educational or informational in nature, they can in practice form part of a structured lead-harvesting process designed to direct consumers toward a particular advice provider or product.

In its March 2026 announcement^[7] of a formal review into the use of lead generation by advice licensees, ASIC made clear that its concerns extend beyond isolated instances of poor advice, to the broader ecosystem through which clients are acquired. This includes the role of follow-up engagement practices, including outbound calling and high-pressure sales tactics, which can move consumers rapidly from initial enquiry to switching decisions. When combined with inadequate advice processes, these models increase the risk that members are transferred into new superannuation arrangements without a clear and demonstrable benefit.

(The depths of ASIC’s concern about this sector were further highlighted when they simultaneously announced their intention to publish a register of advice licensees using lead generation services^[8].)

Switching and consumer protection becomes the regulatory priority

The understandable outrage caused by these fund failures, and the life-altering harm they caused to affected investors, has prompted a strong response from across the industry and among policymakers.

The Superannuation Members Council, for example, representing industry funds, has sought to highlight concerns in respect of superannuation switching more broadly^[9]. Their position – including analysis suggesting that switching among younger members may often be to their detriment – has been the subject of much discussion and debate across the industry^[10].

Regardless of the veracity of their claims, concerns around superannuation switching as a potential source of consumer harm have clearly gained traction among policymakers at the highest levels and are already influencing policy direction.

DBFO Tranche 2 put on the backburner

Perhaps the most visible example of this influence can be seen in the Federal Government’s recently revised financial services reform agenda.

In early 2026, Financial Services Minister Daniel Mulino indicated that his regulatory focus would shift toward addressing poor consumer outcomes linked to advice, lead generation and superannuation flows^[11]. While broadly welcomed at a community level, for advisers this shift has had a clear consequence, with the overdue Tranche 2 of the DBFO now a lower priority and delayed.

During a recent adviser webinar, FAAA CEO Sarah Abood commented on her dealings with the Minister, saying she didn’t believe the reforms are dead but that “DBFO appears to be further back in the queue”^[12].

This change in focus is already evident, with April 2026 seeing Treasury release two consultations for proposed legislation directly impacting switching activities:

• “Enhancing member protections in the superannuation system”^[13]
  Changes considered include limits on the deduction of fees from super when switches are involved, and the introduction of a cooling-off period for switches.
• “Curbing lead generation activity”^[14]
  Examining the role of third-party marketing firms, referral arrangements and client acquisition models in initiating switching activity.

(A third consultation was released at the same time, addressing changes to the CSLR).

Proposed switching advice reforms: the consultations in detail

The two Treasury consultations highlighted above make it clear that superannuation switching is now being treated as a system-level concern, spanning advice quality, distribution practices and trustee oversight. Each is explored in more detail below.

Consultation 1: advice fees to be prohibited where switching is involved?

Here Treasury proposes mechanisms to protect members from adverse switching outcomes, including a cooling-off period and prohibiting or limiting the deduction of fees from super where switching is involved.

Key reforms proposed include:

• Introduce a waiting period for inter-fund superannuation switching
  Require members to formally confirm their request to switch within a mandated waiting period (for example 5 days).
• Limit fee deductions for switching-related financial advice
  Options include total prohibition of fee deductions for switching related advice (requiring clients to pay out of pocket), targeted prohibition (for example based on age or balance thresholds), fee caps, or requiring trustees of the receiving fund to review fee deductions in line with members’ best financial interests.

Other proposals include strengthening platform governance, increasing penalties under the SIS Act, and a requirement for trustees to compensate members for eligible losses.

Consultation 2: Lead generation – scrutiny of client acquisition models

These proposals reflect a growing concern that poor consumer outcomes can originate well before advice is formally provided.

Key changes put forward include:

• Regulation of lead generation activity
  Options include bringing prescribed lead generation activities within the financial services regulatory framework or banning certain unlicensed communications to consumers about superannuation.
• Accountability of advisers and licensees
  Proposals include enhancing the accountability of licensees for the conduct of lead generators and clarifying how existing obligations apply where clients are referred through these arrangements.
• Extension of anti-hawking requirements
  Looks at options to strengthen anti-hawking protections, including conditions around consumer consent and limits on unsolicited contact.
• Remuneration structures linked to referrals
  Options include capturing lead generators under the conflicted remuneration framework or clarifying the scope of benefits that may incentivise poor conduct.
• Advertising and disclosure requirements
  Canvases additional measures to improve transparency, including requirements relating to financial advertising and earlier regulatory intervention.

Compliant switching advice – a refresher

ASIC Info Sheet 182^[15], first published in 2013, sets out how advisers should approach superannuation switching advice in practice, containing detailed guidance and practical tips.

Ahead of any of the abovementioned proposed reforms becoming law, advisers may find it useful to refresh their knowledge of ASIC’s expectations in this area of advice.

1. What is super switching advice?

Super switching advice refers to personal advice given to a retail client about:

• transferring an existing super balance (in whole or part) to another fund
• redirecting future contributions from one fund to another.

Advisers must consider the substance of the advice, including:

• verbal discussions
• Statements of Advice (SOAs)
• Financial Services Guides (FSGs)
• other written communications.

ASIC assesses the overall impression created by the advice.

Compliance tip

In ASIC’s surveillance, they will look closely at the files of advisers who seem to have a number of clients who only want advice about the ‘to’ fund, although they are still eligible to remain in their ‘from’ fund.

2. Satisfying the best interests duty

Super switching advice must satisfy all elements of the best interests duty.

This requires advisers to:

• Make reasonable inquiries into the client’s relevant circumstances, including:
  • age, dependants and retirement objectives
  • financial needs and goals
  • insurance requirements
  • existing super and investments
  • tax position
  • risk tolerance and financial literacy.
• Investigate and understand the subject matter of the advice, including:
  • both the existing (‘from’) fund and proposed (‘to’) fund
  • the consequences of switching.
• Provide advice that is in the client’s best interests.

ASIC states that switching advice will generally be inappropriate where:

• the overall benefits of the ‘to’ fund are likely to be lower than the ‘from’ fund, unless outweighed by cost savings
• the ‘to’ fund has higher costs without a clear basis that it better meets the client’s needs.

Compliance tip

Where advisers recommend switching, but there is no obvious overall advantage to the client in making the switch, ASIC is more likely to look closely at the disclosure given to the client about conflicts, fees and the basis for the advice.

3. Information about the ‘from’ fund

Advisers must obtain and consider relevant information about the client’s existing fund.

Sources may include:

• Product Disclosure Statements and product dashboards
• member statements and annual reports
• fund websites or direct contact with the trustee
• independent research.

If sufficient information cannot be obtained, the adviser should seek the information directly or decline to provide switching advice.

Compliance tip

Switching advice cannot be provided without sufficient information about the ‘from’ fund, and a lack of client-provided information does not remove this obligation.

4. Statement of Advice requirements

For all super switching advice, the SOA must clearly explain:

• the costs of the recommendation
• the benefits of the recommendation
• the significant consequences of acting on the advice.

This applies to both full balance transfers and the redirection of future contributions.

Examples of inadequate disclosure include:

• statements that fees are higher without quantifying the difference
• references to “better features” without explaining what they are and why they are relevant
• generic statements about potential loss of insurance without detail.

Compliance tip

It might be misleading to describe a feature of the ‘to’ fund as a benefit of making the switch unless that feature satisfies a client’s needs or objectives and is not already available in the ‘from’ fund.

5. Insurance considerations

Advisers must consider the impact of switching on insurance arrangements.

This includes:

• identifying existing cover in the “from” fund
• assessing whether equivalent cover is available in the “to” fund
• explaining any loss, reduction or change in cover

Compliance tip

Disclosure must go beyond stating that “if you have insurance, you will lose it if you switch”.

Advisers should explain:

• the level of cover
• cost implications
• impact on the client.

6. Advice involving SMSFs

Where switching involves establishing an SMSF, advisers must consider:

• the client’s ability to act as trustee
• financial literacy and understanding of obligations
• time and resources required to manage the fund
• ongoing costs
• availability and cost of insurance.

Clients must also understand that SMSFs do not have the same protections as APRA-regulated funds

Compliance tip

ASIC will look for instances where an adviser has:

• advised a client to establish an SMSF when their current super savings are insufficient and their circumstances do not otherwise support the advice; or
• failed to advise a client properly about ongoing costs (at least in very broad terms, based on average costs) and the time and skill needed to administer an SMSF.

7. Use of disclaimers

Disclaimers may be used to define the scope of advice in limited circumstances. However, disclaimers do not remove an adviser’s obligation to:

• make reasonable inquiries into the client’s circumstances
• investigate the subject matter of the advice
• ensure the advice is appropriate

Compliance tip

Even if a disclaimer says, ‘this is not advice about the ‘from’ fund’, this disclaimer will not let you limit your consideration to the ‘to’ fund if the substance of your advice is or includes a recommendation to switch.

Practical application of INFO 182

ASIC’s position is that switching advice must be supported by a clear, evidence-based rationale.

In practice, this requires advisers to demonstrate:

• a comparison of the ‘from’ and ‘to’ fund
• a clear explanation of costs and benefits
• consideration of insurance and other consequences
• a documented basis for concluding the client is better off.

Where these elements are not present, the advice is likely to be considered inappropriate.

Additional considerations in light of the proposed reforms

Although the proposed reforms to switching and lead generation are not yet law, they provide a clear indication of where regulatory scrutiny is likely to increase.

Lead generation

In anticipation of the proposed reforms, advisers should:

• be able to clearly explain how a client entered the advice process
• review whether any referral or lead generation arrangements are transparent in their commercial intent
• consider whether the client journey, from initial engagement through to advice, could be seen as influencing a decision to switch

Advice fees and switching

In anticipation of these reforms, advisers should:

• ensure that any switching recommendation can demonstrate a clear net benefit after fees
• consider how the method of fee deduction, particularly from superannuation at the point of switching, would be viewed by a regulator or trustee
• ensure the link between the advice provided and the fee charged is clearly articulated and documented

Conclusion

Recent high-profile fund failures have seen superannuation switching take centre stage as both a media issue and a regulatory priority. ASIC’s review activity and Treasury’s consultations make clear that scrutiny is increasing, not just on the quality of advice, but on how switching is initiated and paid for.

For advisers, their core obligations remain unchanged. Switching advice must be supported by a clear rationale, grounded in the client’s best interests and able to demonstrate a net benefit after fees.

As the level of scrutiny intensifies, advice processes must now stand up to closer examination across the full client journey, from acquisition through to implementation. Advisers who maintain strong documentation and clear client reasoning will be best placed to deliver compliant and defensible switching advice now and in the future.

Take the FAAA accredited quiz to earn 0.5 CPD hour:

CPD Quiz

The following CPD quiz is accredited by the FAAA at 0.5 hour.

Legislated CPD Area: Regulatory Compliance & Consumer Protection (0.5 hrs)

ASIC Knowledge Requirements: Superannuation (0.5 hrs)

please log in to start this quiz

———–

References:
[1] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-781-review-of-superannuation-trustee-practices-protecting-members-from-harmful-advice-charges/
[3]https://www.superguide.com.au/super-booster/largest-super-funds#:~:text=Superannuation%20is%20now%20very%20much,Billion.
[4] https://theconexusinstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/State-of-Super-2026-Final-updated-20260213.pdf
[5] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-781-review-of-superannuation-trustee-practices-protecting-members-from-harmful-advice-charges/
[6] https://www.novigi.com.au/the-shield-and-first-guardian-failure-data-and-technology-lessons/
[7] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2026-releases/26-029mr-asic-commences-new-review-of-advice-licensees-that-use-lead-generation-services/
[8] https://www.ifa.com.au/regulator-publishes-advice-lead-generation-list-and-launches-review/
[9] https://www.ifa.com.au/smc-doubles-down-on-super-switching-concerns/
[10] http://investmentmagazine.com.au/2026/03/super-switching-paranoia-drives-misinformation-campaign/
[11] https://www.investmentmagazine.com.au/2026/02/high-priority-mulino-ties-dbfo-to-consumer-protection
[12] https://www.ifa.com.au/ministers-dbfo-language-has-changed-as-wait-for-reforms-continues/
[13] https://storage.googleapis.com/files-au-treasury/treasury/p/prj3bbdc0dd212e233479128/page/c2026_756030.pdf
[14] https://storage.googleapis.com/files-au-treasury/treasury/p/prj3bc3bd170b62c39129f2e/page/c2026_756975.pdf
[15] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/superannuation-funds/superannuation-guidance-relief-and-legislative-instruments/super-switching-advice-complying-with-your-obligations-info-182/

The post CPD: 2026 super switching reforms – process and compliance implications appeared first on AdviserVoice.

A wake-up call for advisers as ASIC modernises advertising rules, demanding timely, transparent communication in an increasingly digital, fast-moving advice landscape.

ASIC brings financial advertising into the 2020s

Comparing the financial advice profession with the advertising industry is a bit like comparing the Post Office with the Beatles – they are two vastly different worlds that very rarely intersect. However, as readers of AdNews^[1] may have noted, one such intersection point has indeed occurred recently, courtesy of ASIC’s decision to overhaul the regulation of financial services advertising.

In November 2025, ASIC announced^[2] a review of RG234, the primary regulatory instrument governing the advertising of financial services products (including credit). Initially flagged in 2024^[3], the review is an arguably long-overdue refresh of guidance first issued in 2012, before TikTok existed, before the word ‘finfluencer’ was first uttered, and of course before AI search became mainstream.

There are two reasons why this review is significant for financial advisers.

Firstly, this guidance is not just directed at product providers but broadly encompasses every individual or company that is promoting some sort of financial product or service (including financial advice).

Secondly, and critically for advisers, the term ‘advertising’ is not limited to paid placements in traditional or social channels, but more broadly applies to the way financial products and services are represented to consumers in order to influence their behaviour. This brings into scope channels and activities that advisers would consider a normal part of day-to-day business development or client education, including websites, promotional brochures, client seminars and social media posts.

The digitisation of advice continues unabated. According to figures released by Adviser Ratings in late 2025, one in four advice practices are now reliant on digital channels for new client attraction⁴ (up from 16%). And ASIC research released in March 2026 gives us a clear view of the future – finding 63% of Gen Z respondents (aged 18–28) use social media for financial information and guidance, while 30% use YouTube and 18% use AI platforms^[5]. Add to that the shifting landscape of the advice ecosystem – the massive growth in the use of ‘lead generation’ businesses for example – and it becomes clear that for financial regulation to fulfil its primary consumer protection role, it must reflect the ongoing evolution of consumer behaviours and industry structure.

While RG 234 does the heavy lifting in this space, it works in conjunction with other instruments policed by ASIC. In this article, we examine the broader regulatory framework governing financial advertising, summarise the key elements of ASIC’s proposed update to RG234, and consider how common advice-sector marketing practices can be impacted.

The regulatory framework governing financial advertising

Although Regulatory Guide 234 (RG 234) is the primary source of guidance on financial advertising, it sits within a broader framework of legislation and regulatory instruments that collectively govern how financial products and services can be promoted to consumers.

At the highest level, the legal foundation is provided by the Corporations Act 2001, which contains several provisions prohibiting misleading or deceptive conduct and false or misleading representations in relation to financial products and services. Importantly, their application is not confined to traditional forms of advertising. In practice this means that marketing materials, websites, social media posts, seminar presentations and other promotional communications may all fall within scope.

ASIC supplements these statutory provisions with other Regulatory Guides and Information Sheets that explain how the law applies in practice.

The individual components of the framework, and their specific roles, are described below.

• RG 234: Advertising financial products and services^[6]
  The central guide covering advertising and promotional conduct. RG 234 outlines ASIC’s expectation that advertising must be clear, balanced and not misleading, and provides examples of promotional practices that may create misleading impressions for consumers.
• RG 53: The use of past performance in promotional material^[7]
  Provides guidance on the presentation of historical investment performance in marketing materials. ASIC has proposed incorporating this guidance into RG 234 as part of the current consultation, which would consolidate advertising guidance into a single instrument.
• RG 244: Giving information, general advice and scaled advice^[8]
  Clarifies the distinction between factual information, general advice and personal advice. This distinction is particularly relevant where advisers use seminars, webinars or other educational events as part of their marketing activity.
• RG 175: AFS licensing: Financial product advisers – conduct and disclosure^[9]
  Sets out the conduct obligations that apply once advice is provided, including the best interests duty and disclosure requirements. While not an advertising guide, these obligations can become relevant where promotional material creates expectations about the nature or scope of advice services.
• INFO 269: Discussing financial products and services online^[10]
  Provides guidance on the discussion and promotion of financial products through online channels, including social media and the activities of finfluencers.
• INFO 271: How to avoid greenwashing^[11]
  Addresses environmental and sustainability claims made in promotional material and highlights the risk of misleading representations about ESG characteristics.

The multi-faceted nature of this framework reinforces how broadly the definition of advertising is interpreted. In practice, any communication – written, verbal, visible, or virtual – that promotes or influences the uptake of a financial product or service, including advice, may well be captured within its scope.

Changing RG234 to reflect the contemporary advice landscape

ASIC has proposed a number of changes to bring RG234 into the present and make it more adaptive to the future. These proposals were published for industry consultation at the end of 2025^[12].

Many of the changes are structural.  The guide’s title will be simplified, duplicated content removed, and some sections reorganised or condensed. In addition, content that previously appeared throughout the guide will be consolidated into appendices, including a quick reference guide summarising key advertising principles.

A substantive change is the proposal to incorporate guidance from RG 53 on the use of past performance in promotional material into the updated RG 234. If implemented, this change would result in RG 53 being withdrawn, with performance advertising guidance contained within a single consolidated guide.

The revised guide will also introduce several new examples drawn from relevant ASIC regulatory and enforcement actions. These examples relate to issues such as the presentation of returns, disclosure of risks, the use of disclaimers, comparisons between financial products and the calculation and presentation of past performance.

Finally, the proposed update recognises and offers guidance around contemporary marketing channels. References to digital promotion, social media and online advertising have been incorporated into the guide, and the growing finfluencer sector is also acknowledged.

Industry response

As expected, the proposed update has also prompted a strong response from industry stakeholders, including associations and product providers. A common theme in these submissions is the need for greater clarity around the application of existing advertising obligations in a digital environment.  ASFA’s submission^[13] for example pointed to the need for further guidance expressly around search engines, social media, streaming, podcasts, influencer-distributed content, comparison sites, and interactive tools.

The FSC^[14] called for the definition of ‘promoters’ to be extended to the growing cohort of lead generation businesses.

There have also been calls for more specific guidance on issues such as the use of past performance, the treatment of short-form content and how key disclosures should be presented where space is constrained.

Distilling ASIC’s guidance into core principles

While RG 234 and related guidance span multiple regulatory instruments, the underlying expectations can be distilled into a small number of core principles. Developing an understanding of these principles can be an important first line of defence for advisers seeking to ensure their marketing activities are compliant.

First, promotional material must not create a misleading overall impression. This is the central test applied by ASIC, and it extends beyond the accuracy of individual statements to the way information is framed and understood by the target audience.

Secondly, important information must be clear and prominent from the outset. Key risks, conditions or limitations should not be hidden in fine print, nor introduced via links to other materials, or later disclosures.

Finally, advertising should present a balanced view of benefits and risks. Messaging that highlights potential advantages without giving appropriate visibility to limitations may create unrealistic expectations for consumers.

A word about disclaimers

The nature of disclaimers, including their size and location, is clearly central to ASIC’s guidance, and indeed the existing version of RG 234 already provides clarification around the treatment of disclaimers in ‘audio and visual’ channels^[15]. While the nature of multimedia channels has evolved significantly, the spirit of that guidance remains clear and relevant in a digital world:

“[Disclaimers] should also have sufficient prominence to effectively convey key information to a reasonable member of the audience on first viewing of the advertisement. Information is less likely to be noticed and understood if it is in fine print, contained within a dense block of text, only shown on television or a computer screen for a brief period, or placed where there is distracting content shown simultaneously.”

Guidelines in action: lead generation funnels

Digital lead generation has become one of the fastest growing client acquisition channels in the advice sector. Consumers are commonly drawn into these funnels through ‘clickbait’ advertising offering such services such as a ‘free super health check’, a lost super search or a retirement readiness quiz. In reality, these services are often little more than a façade for sophisticated lead-harvesting operations.

This business model has, unsurprisingly, attracted significant regulatory attention, and recent ASIC investigations have uncovered numerous examples of third-party marketing firms being paid substantial fees to generate leads through high-pressure online advertising (and follow-up cold calling). In response, in early 2026 ASIC publicly warned consumers^[16] about these tactics in relation to superannuation switching, at the same time announcing a review into – and publishing a list of – advice licensees that rely on lead generation services^[17].

While there remains debate about whether these firms are subject to RG234, they are still subject to the general misleading or deceptive conduct provisions of the Corporations Act, and ASIC’s main concern with the advertising used by these businesses is centred around a lack of transparency, and the overall impression their advertising creates. Messaging that appears to offer independent assistance or a neutral financial ‘health check’ may actually be the first step in a sales funnel designed to direct consumers toward a particular advice provider or financial product.

Even where the underlying claims in the advertisement are technically accurate, the promotional framing may still be misleading if the true commercial purpose of the interaction is not clear to consumers.

Guidelines in action: education as a marketing tactic

Educational marketing has become a common – and successful – business development strategy for many advice practices. Client seminars, webinars and downloadable eBooks allow advisers to help consumers understand complex financial issues such as superannuation or estate planning, while also building a targeted pipeline of prospects.

But as always, when it comes to promoting these resources or events, emphasis and context matter.

Consider the advertising of a webinar on Transition to Retirement (TTR) strategies. Promotional material for the event would likely highlight the potential tax advantages and cash flow benefits of implementing a TTR pension while continuing to work. For many pre-retirees, TTR can indeed be a very powerful and beneficial strategy.

But while these statements may be technically correct, they can be problematic if the benefits of the strategy receive far greater prominence than important qualifications. For example, a TTR strategy will not be appropriate for all clients, and its effectiveness is dependent on specific eligibility and contribution settings.

From a regulatory perspective, ASIC is likely to consider whether important information about risks, limitations or eligibility requirements is presented clearly in the promotion of the webinar. If these elements appear only briefly or are buried in fine print, the overall message may be considered misleading. Just as importantly, it doesn’t matter that processes to qualify prospects may exist further down the line (e.g. at the webinar itself) – ASIC will judge the advertising on its own merits.

As para 51 of RG 234 stipulates:

“If a qualification is required, it must be published at the same time as the original message. Subsequent qualifying disclosures will not be effective as the misleading impression will already have been created.”^[18]

Guidelines in action: social media

Social media has become an increasingly popular communication and marketing channel for advisers. Short-form content such as videos, posts or infographics – discussing financial markets, tax tips, and investment strategies – can be an effective way to engage audiences and build authority.

However, the short attention span of viewers, the cluttered online environment, and the tight size limitations of these channels, generally dictates that messaging be short and impactful. A social media post promoting SMSFs as a way to purchase property is already tapping into a powerful psychological force (our love of bricks and mortar) and so can easily be both brief and effective. But while that’s perfect for social channels, it runs the risk of giving insufficient focus to the considerable risks and limitations associated with this strategy, such as borrowing constraints, liquidity considerations and concentration risk.

Again, downstream disclosures or qualifying processes are irrelevant – ASIC will judge the initial promotion on its own merits, and the brevity dictated by social media formats will not be seen as an excuse to de-emphasise any risks and/or limitations.

Practical takeaways for advisers

While it may be understandable that some AFSLs see marketing activities as sitting outside the formal compliance framework applied to advice itself, the recent regulatory focus on financial advertising suggests that this separation is becoming increasingly difficult to justify. Readers of this article should familiarise themselves with the various guidelines and instruments listed earlier in this article, as well as noting the following key takeaways that can help ensure the broad suite of activities conducted under the marketing umbrella are done so in a compliant way:

1. Remember that the definition of ‘advertising’ is broad, and brings into scope websites, promotional brochures, client seminars and social media posts. As such, undertake a structured review of all such materials through the lens of RG 234.
2. Continually treat promotional material with the same discipline applied to advice documentation. Marketing messages should be reviewed with the same mindset used when assessing client communication and advice documents. The key question is not simply whether statements are technically accurate, but how the intended audience would interpret the statements on first sighting.
3. Ensure a balanced presentation of benefits and qualifications. Promotional material that emphasises the benefits of a strategy, such as tax advantages or investment returns, should ensure that important qualifications are presented clearly and in close proximity to those claims.
4. If using lead generation services or referral partners, review the way these partners present your services to prospects. Advisers should ensure the messaging used by those partners is accurate and meets the same standards expected of the practice itself.
5. Recognise that brevity is not a regulatory defence. Content on websites, or promoted through social media or digital advertising, may be short form through necessity, but the constraints of the channel do not reduce the obligation to present information in a compliant manner.

Conclusion

ASIC’s review of RG 234 does more than modernise a decade-old regulatory guide, it shines a spotlight on the full breadth of obligations that already apply to the way financial products and advice services are promoted. To the extent this framework captures activities traditionally viewed as ‘business development’ or ‘client education’ – rather than marketing – the review may serve as a timely wakeup call.

As ASIC moves towards implementing the revised standards later in 2026, advisers would be well served to treat marketing communication as a core compliance focus rather than a peripheral activity. Reviewing websites, seminar content, social media posts and third-party lead generation arrangements through the lens of RG 234 should not be a theoretical exercise, but rather a practical step in preparing for a regulatory environment where the first impression created by a promotional message will be subject to the same scrutiny as the advice that follows.

Take the FAAA accredited quiz to earn 0.5 CPD hour:

CPD Quiz

The following CPD quiz is accredited by the FAAA at 0.5 hour.

Legislated CPD Area: Regulatory Compliance & Consumer Protection (0.5 hrs)

ASIC Knowledge Requirements: Regulatory Environment (0.5 hrs)

please log in to start this quiz

———–

References:
[1] https://www.adnews.com.au/news/asic-edges-closer-to-new-rules-for-financial-advertising
[2] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/news-items/asic-proposes-updates-to-guidance-on-advertising-financial-products-and-services/
[3] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/news-items/asic-update-on-maintenance-of-regulatory-guides/
[4] https://www.adviserratings.com.au/news/from-compliance-to-cool-how-smart-advisers-beat-finfluencers-at-their-own-game/
[5] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2026-releases/26-049mr-asic-urges-gen-z-to-sense-check-money-advice-as-social-media-fuels-riskier-financial-decisions/#:~:text=(26%2D049MR)-,ASIC%20urges%20Gen%20Z%20to%20’sense%2Dcheck’%20money%20advice,turn%20to%20family%20and%20friends.
[5] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/rkzj5nxb/rg234-published-15-november-2012-20211008.pdf
[6] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/1238984/rg53.pdf
[7] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/tkqi11il/rg244-published-13-december-2012-20211208.pdf
[8] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/pqpe0hwc/rg175-published-21-november-2024-20241219.pdf
[10] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/giving-financial-product-advice/discussing-financial-products-and-services-online/
[11] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/how-to-avoid-greenwashing-when-offering-or-promoting-sustainability-related-products/
[12] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/consultations/cs-37-proposed-update-to-asic-s-guidance-on-advertising-financial-products-and-services/
[13] https://financialnewswire.com.au/superannuation/super-funds-seek-standardised-10-year-past-performance/
[14] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2026/01/include-lead-generators-in-advertising-guidance-fsc/
[15] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/rkzj5nxb/rg234-published-15-november-2012-20211008.pdf
[16] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-02-18/asic-announces-review-into-lead-generators-superannuation/106353740
[17] https://www.moneymanagement.com.au/143800-2/
[18] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/rkzj5nxb/rg234-published-15-november-2012-20211008.pdf

The post CPD: ASIC’s RG 234 Review – a wake-up call for adviser marketing appeared first on AdviserVoice.

Advisers need to be able to explain the role of the FSCP and recognise conduct issues that led to disciplinary outcomes in 2025.

Giving complex advice laws practical meaning

Coming in somewhere north of 800,000 words^[1] (no one is really sure!), the Corporations Act – the overarching legal regime for financial advice – is unquestionably one of the longest, most complex pieces of legislation in Australia and frequently cited as an egregious example of bloated legislation.

A core (and challenging) role for ASIC is to distil all this legislation into more practical guidance for advisers, which it attempts to do through its various Regulatory Guides, Information Sheets, and other published resources.

Crucially, the approach taken by ASIC in providing this guidance is a principles-based one, designed to prioritise professional judgement over ultra-prescriptive rules.

Although well intentioned – helping ensure the adaptability and flexibility of the law in the face of a rapidly changing world (hello AI!) – advisers, licensees and professional bodies have all frequently expressed frustration when ASIC guidance does not clearly indicate how regulators will interpret those principles in real-world scenarios.

Against a backdrop of a fragmented licensee landscape increasingly comprised of small and self-licensed firms, this leaves advisers themselves relying on their own interpretation of ASIC guidance, which, as the FAAA recently noted^[2] “is often complex and appears to be pitched at compliance experts, many of whom are or were employed by the larger licensees.”

What advisers need is not more rules, but clearer, practical direction on how existing obligations will be enforced. And the clearest direction comes from the actual application of the law in real world scenarios. In that context, disciplinary outcomes published by the Financial Services and Credit Panel (FSCP) take on added significance. While formal guidance is principles-based, panel decisions provide concrete illustrations of how those principles are applied when advice conduct is scrutinised after the fact.

During 2025, the FSCP presided over 12 outcomes against advisers, which it published through its Outcomes Register^[3]. This article will examine those outcomes to identify the behaviours currently drawing regulatory attention, the compliance failures triggering disciplinary action, and the practical safeguards advisers can implement in response.

A single disciplinary body to oversee advice

The Financial Services and Credit Panel is the single disciplinary body responsible for oversight of individual financial advisers. Established in response to the 2018 Hayne Royal Commission, the current FSCP framework took effect with the Better Advice Act in January 2022^[4]. The reforms consolidated disciplinary oversight within ASIC, ending the Tax Practitioners Board’s role in regulating advisers and closing the Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority (FASEA), with responsibility for the Code of Ethics transferred to Treasury.

How matters reach the FSCP

In practice, most matters do not originate with the panel itself but through regulatory and licensee processes. The primary pathway is breach reporting by Australian Financial Services licensees, who are required to report significant breaches and likely breaches of core obligations. Internal file reviews, compliance monitoring and remediation programs frequently identify issues before clients become aware of them, making licensee supervision the front line of disciplinary risk.

Complaints lodged with AFCA, ASIC or licensees may also trigger investigations, as can ASIC surveillance activity, thematic reviews, or intelligence, including whistleblower disclosures. Disciplinary exposure often arises from routine compliance processes rather than dramatic misconduct events.

The circumstances that can trigger FSCP involvement are many and varied, including where an adviser is no longer fit and proper to practise, has contravened financial services law or professional standards, provided advice while unregistered, failed to comply with a prior sanction, been involved in another person’s breach, or repeatedly failed to give effect to an AFCA determination. ASIC also retains discretion to convene a panel where it considers disciplinary action may be warranted.

The FSCP has a range of ways it can penalise adviser misconduct.

It can take administrative action against an adviser by issuing warnings or reprimands, it can direct an adviser to take specific training, it can order the suspension or cancellation of an adviser’s registration, issue infringement notices, and recommend to ASIC that it seek to apply to the court for a civil penalty.

Before action is taken, the adviser must be notified of the proposed findings and given an opportunity to respond. Consistent with the regime’s consumer protection focus, significant outcomes are publicised by ASIC and, in some cases, recorded on the Financial Advisers Register. Other outcomes may be published on the Outcomes Register using pseudonyms where identification is not required.

The 2025 FSCP outcomes reveal consistent themes

The 12 outcomes published by the Financial Services and Credit Panel during 2025 reveal a consistent pattern – disciplinary action was concentrated on failures in foundational professional obligations rather than ‘novel’ regulatory issues. These outcomes can be distilled down into 5 themes.

Theme 1: Professionalism and CPD compliance

The largest single category of outcomes (five cases) involved failures to meet continuing professional development (CPD) obligations. Four advisers received reprimands after failing to complete the required 40 hours of CPD across mandatory categories within their licensee’s CPD year^[5]. Panels found breaches of professional standards provisions, reinforcing that CPD is a condition of ongoing registration rather than an administrative exercise.

Commenting on the cases, ASIC specifically called out the practice of ‘cramming’ CPD at the end of the CPD year:

“Completion of CPD requirements should not be left to the last minute and should be spread throughout the CPD year, as good practice.”^[6]

In several cases, advisers completed the missing hours after the breach was identified, yet reprimands were still imposed to underscore the importance of maintaining professional competence while promoting public confidence in adviser standards. Only one of the five advisers avoided sanction due to mitigating circumstances and prompt rectification.

These outcomes reinforce that ASIC sees CPD compliance as a key consumer protection mechanism, “not merely a compliance obligation to tick off”^[7], playing a vital role in ensuring advisers remain technically capable of delivering appropriate advice.

Theme 2: Conflicts of interest

One of the most serious matters involved an adviser (‘Mr V’) recommending clients switch superannuation into a product he was associated with. The panel found the advice was inappropriate, conflicts were inadequately managed, and the adviser had prioritised personal interests over those of clients. Failures included inadequate disclosure, lack of informed consent to remuneration, and charging fees considered neither fair nor reasonable.

The sitting panel was also satisfied that the relevant provider contravened s921E(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 by failing to comply with the Code of Ethics. In particular, the relevant provider was found to have failed to comply with the Values of Trustworthiness and Fairness, and Standards 3, 7 and 9. Specifically, the panel found that Mr V did not obtain the clients ‘free, prior and informed consent’ to all relevant remuneration arrangements by failing to disclose the benefits that he and his associates would receive as a result of the clients investing in the recommended products. The panel also found the fees charged were not ‘fair and reasonable’, labelling them as ‘extraordinary^[8]’.

The panel imposed extensive remediation requirements on the adviser, including compliance reviews, pre-vetting of advice, ethics training and cessation of association with the product. The case demonstrates that disclosure alone does not neutralise conflicts – advisers must be able to demonstrate that their recommendations unequivocally put client interests first.

Theme 3:  Technical advice failures causing consumer harm

Another group of cases involved technically incorrect superannuation advice relating to non-concessional contribution caps and bring-forward arrangements. In these cases, advisers failed to correctly account for prior contributions or existing arrangements, leading to excess contributions and significant adverse tax consequences for clients.

In one case, failure to recognise a prior lump-sum contribution – recommended by the client’s previous adviser – resulted in the client exceeding the cap and being required to withdraw funds of over $157,000 and include associated earnings of over $17,000 in her tax return. In another, advice to contribute across two years ignored that the client was already in year two of a three year bring-forward arrangement, leading to the client making an excess non concessional contribution of over $109,000. She was then required by the ATO to withdraw over $312,000 from her fund and include $39,000 of associated earnings in her tax return^[9].

These cases illustrate how incorrect application of complex superannuation contribution rules can produce significant client harm, even where the advice process itself appears otherwise routine.

Theme 4: Failure to act in clients’ best interests

Unlike the contribution cap cases, which involved technical misapplication of superannuation rules, several outcomes arose from failures in the advice process itself, particularly inadequate investigation of the client’s existing arrangements.

Across multiple cases, panels found breaches of the Best Interests Duty and the requirement to provide appropriate advice. These breaches often stemmed from inadequate investigation of client circumstances, failure to consider existing arrangements, or insufficient analysis of alternatives.

Clear examples arose in retirement advice matters. In one case involving an account-based pension (ABP) strategy, the adviser failed to properly consider the client’s defined benefit entitlements when recommending additional contributions, resulting in the client exceeding concessional contribution caps. In another case, an adviser recommended commencing an ABP without verifying that the client had already established one, causing the client to exceed the transfer balance cap. In both matters, the panels cited a lack of diligence in assessing the client’s existing superannuation position and treated the failures as breaches of the Best Interests Duty and the Code of Ethics’ requirement for diligence.

In the first case mentioned, the sitting panel issued a written direction requiring the relevant provider to undertake at least five hours of continuing professional education covering retirement planning in the next 12 months. They stipulated that education “must be capable of being objectively verified by a competent source, not be provided by the relevant provider’s licensee, be in addition to the relevant provider’s existing continuing professional obligations and must be approved by ASIC before it is undertaken^[10]”

For practitioners, the message is that robust fact-finding and documented decision-making, particularly in retirement advice – where prior arrangements materially affect outcomes – are essential safeguards against compliance risk.

Theme 5: Escalation of sanctions for systemic misconduct

The most severe outcome handed down in 2025 involved a two-year registration prohibition order against a (publicly named) adviser whose conduct in recommending the establishment of self-managed superannuation funds was found to be “systemic and displayed a lack of care and a level of incompetence^[11]”. The panel concluded that the adviser had breached multiple statutory duties and professional standards, including providing misleading advice and failing to prioritise client interests.

This case illustrates the escalation pathway available where misconduct reflects ongoing deficiencies rather than isolated errors and demonstrates the panel’s willingness to remove advisers from practice where consumer protection concerns are significant.

What the outcomes collectively signal

The 12 outcomes handed down in 2025 almost universally involved failures in processes and compliance obligations that were both foundational and straightforward. These were not cases involving obscure case law, or overly challenging technical scenarios. They involved meeting CPD obligations, properly investigating client circumstances, doing basic arithmetic, and avoiding conflicts of interest so big they could be seen from space. Indeed, over 99% of advisers would say they involved “simply doing your job”.

Practical adviser lessons from the 2025 FSCP outcomes

Notwithstanding their sometimes-mundane nature, these decisions – published in full on the ASIC Outcomes Register – do provide valuable practical guidance on how adherence to ASIC’s ‘principles-based’ guidance will be judged in real-world scenarios.

The cases sanctioned during 2025 point to recurring weaknesses in governance, advice processes and documentation rather than non-compliance with obscure legal technicalities. For practitioners, the message is that strong process discipline remains the most effective protection against consumer harm and regulator action.

From a professionalism perspective, CPD compliance should be managed as an ongoing obligation rather than an annual task. Advisers should maintain real-time tracking of hours across mandatory categories, retain verifiable evidence of completion, and conduct periodic reviews (e.g., quarterly) well before the end of the CPD year. Aligning personal CPD plans with licensee requirements can also reduce the risk of inadvertent shortfalls in particular categories.

Several cases arose from incomplete fact finding or failure to verify key client information before making recommendations. Advisers should confirm contribution histories, existing superannuation arrangements, pension commencements and defined benefit entitlements before providing retirement advice. Where assumptions are unavoidable, they should be documented and explained to the client. Peer review or the internal sign-off of complex superannuation strategies can provide an additional safeguard.

Conflict management also requires diligence (and vigilance). Where advisers recommend products with which they have any association, they should be able to demonstrate why the recommendation remains appropriate after considering alternatives. Clear documentation of informed consent is essential. Disclosure alone is unlikely to be sufficient if the advice outcome appears to favour the adviser’s interests.

The cases also reinforce the processes underpinning the Best Interests Duty. Comprehensive file notes, documented inquiries and a clear rationale for recommendations are critical. Advisers should always assume that their files may later be reviewed by a regulator and ensure the reasoning behind each decision is evident from the files.

Finally, early engagement with licensee compliance teams can prevent issues from escalating. Where deficiencies are identified through audits or reviews, prompt remediation and openness with supervisors may reduce the likelihood of referral to the FSCP. In a principles-based regulatory environment, consistent adherence to disciplined processes is the most reliable way to demonstrate that advice is client focused and legally and ethically sound.

At a glance compliance checklist

Professionalism and CPD

• Track CPD hours continuously across all mandatory categories
• Retain evidence of completion
• Review progress quarterly and aim for an even distribution of learning
• Ensure alignment with licensee requirements

Advice processes and fact finding

• Identify and interrogate prior advice
• Verify contribution histories and confirm existing arrangements
• Be especially aware of defined benefit entitlements
• Allow for clients not fully understanding their existing arrangements
• If assumptions need to be made, document and explain to the client
• Seek peer review of complex super strategies

Conflict management

• Assess whether any recommended product involves an entity in which the adviser or related parties hold a financial or governance interest
• Demonstrate why recommendations remain appropriate even where an association/conflict exists
• Consider and document alternatives
• Obtain informed client consent
• Ensure fees are defensible and clearly linked to client benefits

Best Interests Duty

• Conduct comprehensive fact finding
• Verify client information
• Maintain detailed file notes
• Document rationale for decisions/recommendations
• Ensure file demonstrates a client-first approach

Escalation prevention

• Early and ongoing engagement with a compliance provider (internal or external)
• Address any audit findings and implement required remediation without delay
• Treat compliance processes as risk management tools rather than burdensome ‘red tape’.

Conclusion

In the principles-based regulatory environment underpinning financial advice, advisers are often required to exercise judgement in circumstances where the law (via ASIC) does not prescribe a single correct course of action. The FSCP outcomes provide valuable clarity about how that judgement will be assessed when decisions are scrutinised ‘after the fact’. They show that regulatory expectations are grounded less in technical perfection and more in diligent adherence to simple, client-first processes.

As the advice profession navigates a complex, ever-changing regulatory framework, disciplinary decisions offer a concrete guide to what compliant conduct looks like in practice, turning high level, legalistic ASIC guidance into real world lessons. Advisers who apply these lessons will be better positioned to manage their own risk and protect their clients from harm.

Take the FAAA accredited quiz to earn 0.5 CPD hour:

CPD Quiz

The following CPD quiz is accredited by the FAAA at 0.5 hour.

Legislated CPD Area: Regulatory Compliance & Consumer Protection (0.5 hrs)

ASIC Knowledge Requirements: Regulatory Environment (0.5 hrs)

please log in to start this quiz

———–

References:
[1] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2021/05/alrc-bombshell-chapter-7-removal-from-corps-act-on-the-table/
[2] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2025/10/advisers-relying-on-their-own-interpretation-of-reg-guides-faaa
[3] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/financial-advice/how-asic-regulates-financial-advice/financial-services-and-credit-panel-fscp/fscp-outcomes-register/
[4] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/news-items/better-advice-act-broadens-asic-s-regulatory-responsibilities/
[5] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/news-items/asic-acts-against-financial-advisers-for-failing-to-meet-continuing-professional-development-cpd-requirements
[6] https://www.ifa.com.au/asic-says-it-will-continue-to-act-on-adviser-cpd-non-compliance
[7] Ibid.
[8] https://www.moneymanagement.com.au/fscp-raps-adviser-over-extraordinary-fees-inappropriate-advice/
[9]
[10] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2025/05/fscp-cases-show-ato-portal-access-could-offer-safeguard/
[11] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/financial-advice/how-asic-regulates-financial-advice/financial-services-and-credit-panel-fscp/fscp-outcomes-register/
[12] https://www.smsfadviser.com/adviser-banned-for-recommending-clients-establish-smsfs/

The post CPD: Practical compliance lessons from the FSCP 2025 decisions appeared first on AdviserVoice.

ASIC’s findings across REP 575 and REP 824 highlight that the consumer protection risks associated with SMSFs are not theoretical.

Introduction

When considering the various sector reviews conducted by ASIC during 2025, one could be forgiven for recalling Taylor Swift’s sentiment from 2017 “This is why we can’t have nice things”.

Because true to their brief of revealing the (small number of) bad apples in advice, and hot on the heels of exposing red flags in both the private credit and managed account sectors, November 2025 saw ASIC turn its gaze to Self-Managed Super Funds (SMSFs), with the release of REP 824, a damning examination of the advice behind SMSF establishments.

The headline finding of this review was that more than 60% of the advice files reviewed failed the Best Interests Duty and were therefore non-compliant^[1]. The review also identified a consistent pattern of other advice failures, explored in more detail below.

ASIC’s scrutiny of SMSF establishments, and the advice behind them, comes at a time of record growth for the sector, which now comprises over 1.2 million members, holding over $1 trillion in assets in more than 650,000 funds^[2]. It also comes at a time when AFCA complaints about SMSF advice almost doubled over 12 months, to now represent a third of all advice complaints^[3].

For advisers, the sheer size and significance of the SMFS sector (it accounts for around one quarter of total superannuation savings^[4]), as well as ASIC’s heightened scrutiny, makes it imperative to understand the full compliance context for SMSF advice, including the consumer motivations behind SMSF establishment and the challenges in managing SMSFs.

As well as examining this context, this article will explore the reasons ASIC regard SMSF advice as high risk, explain the detailed findings and recommendations of REP 824^[5], and provide a practical framework for advisers to ensure their advice in this sector remains compliant and in the best interests of clients.

Consumer context: the myth of control and love of property drives SMSF growth

In order to appreciate the reasons for ASIC’s concerns, and their likely areas of focus, it is helpful to first understand the context for the popularity of SMSFs.

In their 2018 report into SMSF advice – REP 575 – ASIC found that the strongest single consumer motivation to establish an SMSF was a desire to have more ‘control’ – cited by 48% of trustees establishing SMSFs between 2015 and 2018^[6].

This control included financial control (for example, anticipated control over investment performance); and emotional control (for example, investing in an asset class that gives a greater feeling of security). Other motivations included the desire to purchase a property (22%), the desire to have more say in equity selection (29%), and the desire to pay lower fees (25%).

In the years since 2018, this context has evolved significantly. Downward pressure on fund manager and administration fees has been significant, undermining the ‘I can do it myself cheaper’ argument. And when it comes to control, consumers have far more avenues to be ‘hands -on’ with their investments, either through innovative retail offerings, or managed accounts. In other words, the strength of these particular motivations has diminished somewhat.

What has endured however is the desire to use SMSFs as a vehicle to purchase property.

While for older investors, this was often due to an inherent conservatism – manifesting as an overriding preference for bricks and mortar – in more recent times, investors in their mid-forties (the median age for new SMSFs is 46^[7]) are seeing SMSFs as a way to secure an investment property in an increasingly expensive market.

This nexus between property and SMSFs is plain for all to see when one examines ATO data on asset allocation. As seen in Table 1, property (residential and commercial) accounts for 22.2% of all SMSF assets.

SMSF ownership does not signal any degree of financial savvy, nor particularly high levels of wealth.

The stereotype of the SMSF as a ‘mum and dad fund’ is reasonably accurate, with around 68% of SMSFs comprising two members. While the median asset holding for all funds is $933,000, new funds are being established with median assets of just $345,000. Just over half of all SMSFs are in the accumulation phase^[9].

Despite their superior long term growth potential compared to domestic equities, overseas shares are not widely held, with ATO data showing they account for just 2.1% of assets for funds in accumulation phase (when growth should be prioritised) – another signal of an overall lack of sophistication.

Asset concentration, borrowing and retirement risk

Asset concentration within SMSFs has been a persistent concern for ASIC, evident across both REP 575 and REP 824, particularly where property and borrowing are involved.

While concentration risk can exist in any investment structure, ASIC has repeatedly observed that it is most acute in newly established SMSFs, and often insufficiently addressed in advice files.

ATO data shows that a material proportion of SMSFs hold extremely concentrated portfolios. Almost 30 per cent of SMSFs have 90 per cent or more of their assets invested in a single asset class, with around one-third of those funds concentrated in property^[10]. This level of concentration significantly increases exposure to liquidity risk, valuation risk and sequencing risk, particularly as members approach retirement.

Borrowing amplifies these risks at the point of establishment. REP 824 found that 50 per cent of the SMSF establishment advice files reviewed involved a limited recourse borrowing arrangement (LRBA), most commonly to facilitate direct property investment^[11]. ASIC observed that advisers frequently failed to adequately assess whether the SMSF could sustain loan repayments under adverse conditions, such as interest rate increases, rental vacancies or reduced contributions. Stress testing and downside analysis were often absent from client files.

Separate from servicing risk, ASIC also identified systemic liquidity weaknesses. Property-heavy SMSFs with LRBAs often had limited capacity to fund ongoing expenses or pension payments without relying on continued contributions or asset sales. ASIC noted that advisers frequently underestimated how illiquid assets constrain cash-flow flexibility over time, particularly once members transition into retirement, when contribution inflows cease and benefit payments commence.

ASIC also linked concentration and borrowing risk to poor insurance outcomes. In several high-risk files, advisers recommended establishing an SMSF and acquiring property without adequately considering the erosion of insurance cover previously held within APRA-regulated funds. Where insurance was retained, it was often reduced or poorly aligned to the fund’s increased financial risk profile.

High-risk SMSF business models and conflicts of interest

ASIC’s review also highlights that non-compliant SMSF advice is frequently associated with particular business models, rather than isolated adviser error. A recurring feature of higher-risk files reviewed for REP 824 was the presence of property-led SMSF establishment models. In these arrangements, the decision to establish an SMSF was often closely linked to a pre-determined property acquisition, sometimes supported by an LRBA. ASIC observed that where property outcomes effectively drove the advice, assessment of alternatives, diversification, liquidity and retirement outcomes was frequently subordinated or incomplete.

ASIC also identified risks arising from lead-generation and referral arrangements, particularly where advisers received clients from property promoters, accountants or marketing businesses with a commercial interest in SMSF establishment. Even where such arrangements were disclosed, ASIC questioned whether advisers had taken sufficient steps to ensure that the advice was free from undue influence and demonstrably prioritised client interests over third-party outcomes.

Vertical integration and related-party arrangements were another area of focus. ASIC found that in some cases, advisers recommended SMSF strategies that directed revenue toward related entities through property development fees, borrowing arrangements, administration services or ongoing advice fees. REP 824 reinforces that disclosure alone is not sufficient where conflicts are material. Advisers and licensees must be able to demonstrate that conflicts have been actively identified, managed and, where necessary, avoided.

Importantly, ASIC’s findings make clear that these risks are not mitigated by client consent or enthusiasm. Where advice outcomes align too neatly with commercial incentives, ASIC will look closely at whether the advice was shaped by professional judgement or by the underlying business model. In REP 824, files associated with conflicted or property-centric models were disproportionately represented among those assessed as posing a high risk of consumer detriment.

Where commercial structures increase the likelihood of bias, ASIC expects stronger governance, clearer separation of functions and more rigorous documentation to demonstrate that client interests have genuinely been prioritised.

Other risks faced by SMSFs

In addition to those risks driven by market context, trustees and members face a variety of other significant risks, including, but not limited to:

• Risks associated with the complexity of managing the administration and compliance obligations of SMSFs
• Underestimating the time and cost of managing an SMSF
• The costs of small balance funds
• Insurance cover risks (through inappropriate cancellation of existing cover or reduced access to group rates)
• Poor investment decisions made by unsophisticated investors
• Reduced access to dispute resolution bodies
• Lack of statutory compensation for theft or fraud
• Complexities and costs associated with fund structure, including
  • Winding up the fund in the event of death or relationship breakdown
  • Loss of capacity of a trustee
  • Fund value falling below a financially viable level
  • The treatment of death benefit nominations

These risks add an additional layer of complexity that advisers must be conscious of when providing SMSF advice.

REP 824 in detail: where SMSF advice fails

REP 824 concludes that the compliance issues identified in SMSF establishment advice are not isolated technical errors, but recurring failures in how advisers apply professional judgement. In conducting their review, ASIC reviewed 100 SMSF establishment advice files and found that 62 failed to demonstrate compliance with the Best Interests Duty (BID), with 27 raising significant concerns about potential client detriment. These failures occurred across a range of adviser and licensee business models, suggesting systemic rather than individual weaknesses.

A central failing was the treatment of SMSF advice as an execution exercise rather than a suitability assessment. ASIC found that in 58 of the reviewed files, advisers did not base their advice on the client’s relevant personal circumstances. In many cases, advisers acted on a client’s stated interest in establishing an SMSF without undertaking a reasonable investigation into whether that structure was appropriate. ASIC was explicit that reliance on client preference, autonomy or a desire for ‘control’ does not satisfy the BID.

Another recurring issue was the failure to properly assess and document alternatives. ASIC found that 53 of the advice files did not demonstrate that advisers had conducted a reasonable investigation into alternatives to an SMSF, including APRA-regulated superannuation funds. Where alternatives were mentioned, documentation often failed to explain why those options were unsuitable in the client’s circumstances, contributing to ASIC’s conclusion that advice lacked a reasonable basis.

Property-driven strategies featured prominently in non-compliant advice. Of the files reviewed, 57 involved direct property investment, and as mentioned previously, 50 involved limited recourse borrowing arrangements. ASIC observed that in many of these cases advisers failed to adequately consider concentration risk, liquidity constraints, cash-flow sustainability or downside scenarios, particularly in retirement. These omissions were a significant factor in files assessed as posing a high risk of client detriment.

ASIC also identified widespread shortcomings in the treatment of insurance and trustee capability. In 16 of the 27 high-detriment files, advisers failed to properly consider insurance needs following SMSF establishment. In addition, ASIC frequently found insufficient assessment of whether clients had the skills, time and capacity to meet their ongoing trustee obligations.

In summary, REP 824 signals that SMSF advice most commonly fails where advisers prioritise client intent, structural preference or commercial convenience over evidence-based suitability analysis.

The legal test ASIC applies to SMSF advice

While REP 824 documents how SMSF advice fails in practice, it also shows how ASIC assesses those failures against the legal framework governing personal advice. ASIC’s analysis is anchored in the BID, the appropriateness obligation, and the requirement that advisers base their advice on a reasonable investigation of relevant alternatives, as set out in the Corporations Act and reinforced through ASIC guidance.

Through INFO 274^[12] (‘Tips for giving self-managed superannuation fund advice’) ASIC sets out an expectation that SMSF advice requires advisers to apply heightened professional judgement. Advisers must assess not only the client’s objectives and preferences, but also their financial position, risk tolerance, experience, capability and capacity to meet the ongoing governance obligations of running an SMSF. INFO 274 explicitly warns that an SMSF will not be appropriate for all clients, and that perceived benefits such as control or flexibility must be weighed against costs, risks and complexity.

REP 824 demonstrates how ASIC applies this guidance in practice. Under BID, ASIC rejected advice rationales that relied on client intent, autonomy or a desire for control without evidence that an SMSF delivered a net benefit relative to alternatives. ASIC emphasised that professional judgement cannot be displaced by client request or informed consent.

ASIC also assessed whether advisers could demonstrate that an SMSF recommendation was appropriate in light of the client’s circumstances, including cost-effectiveness, trustee capability and long-term retirement outcomes. Where advisers failed to meaningfully compare SMSFs with APRA regulated superannuation funds, ASIC concluded that the advice lacked a reasonable basis.

Taken together – REPs 575 and 824 and INFO 274 – clarify that SMSF advice is subject to a higher evidentiary threshold than many other superannuation recommendations. Advisers must be able to demonstrate, on file, not only why a client wanted an SMSF, but why establishing one was legally appropriate and in the client’s best interests.

SMSF governance essentials: investment, insurance, and trustee capability

The appropriateness of an SMSF does not turn solely on the decision to establish the fund, but on the quality of its ongoing governance. INFO 274 places particular emphasis on investment governance, insurance considerations and trustee capability, and REP 824 demonstrates how failures in these areas continue to underpin non-compliant advice.

Investment governance and diversification

INFO 274 requires advisers to consider whether clients are capable of implementing and maintaining an appropriate investment strategy within an SMSF, including managing diversification, liquidity and risk over time. ASIC expects advisers to assess not only the proposed asset mix at establishment, but whether the strategy remains sustainable as circumstances change. REP 824 found that advisers frequently failed to articulate an investment rationale beyond facilitating a specific asset purchase, most commonly property, with limited consideration of diversification or downside risk. Where investment strategies were highly concentrated, ASIC expected stronger justification and clearer evidence that risks had been understood and accepted in an informed way.

Cash flow, liquidity and retirement outcomes

ASIC guidance also requires advisers to consider how an SMSF will meet ongoing cash-flow needs, including expenses, loan repayments and pension payments. INFO 274 warns that illiquid or leveraged strategies may be unsuitable where they compromise flexibility or increase the risk of adverse retirement outcomes. REP 824 found that many advice files lacked evidence of stress testing or scenario analysis, particularly where borrowing was involved, undermining the appropriateness of the recommended strategy.

Insurance considerations

Insurance is a recurring governance weakness in SMSF advice. INFO 274 explicitly requires advisers to consider whether clients will have appropriate insurance cover after establishing an SMSF, and whether cover previously held in an APRA-regulated fund will be lost, reduced or become more expensive. REP 824 identified multiple files where insurance was either not considered at all or was addressed superficially, despite the increased financial risk associated with concentrated or leveraged strategies.

Trustee capability and ongoing oversight

INFO 274 emphasises that advisers must assess whether clients have the time, skills and capacity to meet their ongoing trustee obligations. REP 824 shows that advisers often underestimated the operational and compliance burden of SMSFs, particularly for clients with limited experience managing complex investment arrangements. ASIC expects advisers to consider not only initial capability, but how trustee competence will be supported over time. 

Practical compliance checklist: what ASIC expects to see in SMSF advice

For advisers and licensees, ASIC’s expectations are easily distilled into a practical checklist:

Before recommending an SMSF

• Clear articulation of why an SMSF is being considered
• Documented comparison with APRA-regulated alternatives
• Assessment of trustee capability, time and experience
• Explicit consideration of costs and scale 

Where property or borrowing is involved

• Analysis of concentration risk and diversification
• Cash-flow modelling and stress testing
• Consideration of downside and exit scenarios
• Documentation of why borrowing is appropriate

Investment and insurance governance

• An articulated investment rationale, not just an asset outcome
• Consideration of liquidity and retirement phase needs
• Documented insurance assessment and replacement strategy

Conflicts and oversight

• Identification of any referral, related-party or commercial conflicts
• Evidence of how conflicts were managed, not just disclosed
• Licensee oversight where higher-risk models are used

ASIC’s consistent position is that SMSF advice will be judged on evidence rather than adviser intent.

Conclusion

ASIC’s findings across REP 575 and REP 824 highlight that the consumer protection risks associated with SMSFs are not theoretical. They arise where proactive client demand, asset preference or perceived control displaces disciplined suitability analysis, and where advisers fail to adequately test whether an SMSF structure can support sustainable retirement outcomes over time. The persistence of these issues, despite years of regulatory guidance, suggests that structural risks in SMSF advice remain poorly understood or insufficiently challenged in practice.

Importantly, ASIC’s scrutiny is not confined to whether an SMSF was legally established, but to whether the advice process properly addressed alternatives, risks, governance and trustee capability in a way that was specific to the client’s circumstances. Where advice relies on assumptions of favourable markets, continued contributions or client confidence alone, it is unlikely to meet regulatory expectations. This is particularly so where advice involves borrowing, concentrated investments or the loss of default insurance protections.

SMSF advice demands a higher standard of investigation, documentation and ongoing oversight than many other forms of personal advice. Those who approach SMSFs as a product outcome rather than a governance framework expose clients, and themselves, to unnecessary risk. By contrast, advisers who apply rigorous suitability analysis, clearly evidence their reasoning and maintain disciplined review processes are far better placed to deliver compliant advice and protect long-term client outcomes.

Take the FAAA accredited quiz to earn 0.5 CPD hour:

CPD Quiz

The following CPD quiz is accredited by the FAAA at 0.5 hour.

Legislated CPD Area: Regulatory Compliance & Consumer Protection (0.5 hrs)

ASIC Knowledge Requirements: SMSF (0.5 hrs)

please log in to start this quiz

———

References:
[1] https://www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/most-smsf-advice-not-complying-with-best-interest-test-asic-says-20251106-p5n86t
[2] https://www.ato.gov.au/individuals-and-families/super-for-individuals-and-families/self-managed-super-funds-smsf/smsf-newsroom/latest-annual-statistics-for-smsfs
[3] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2025/07/afca-complaints-show-tale-of-two-sectors/
[4] https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/2fd970ec-984e-4593-bbad-2e69a5fa7a89/resource/7a50c5c8-5c0e-4a4b-a11e-feaad39f2bd0/download/smsf-annual-overview-2023-24.xlsx
[5] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/g2jloagp/rep824-published-6-november-2025.pdf
[6] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/4779820/rep-575-published-28-june-2018.pdf
[7] https://www.ato.gov.au/individuals-and-families/super-for-individuals-and-families/self-managed-super-funds-smsf/smsf-newsroom/latest-annual-statistics-for-smsfs
[8] https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/2fd970ec-984e-4593-bbad-2e69a5fa7a89/resource/7a50c5c8-5c0e-4a4b-a11e-feaad39f2bd0/download/smsf-annual-overview-2023-24.xlsx
[9] https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/2fd970ec-984e-4593-bbad-2e69a5fa7a89/resource/7a50c5c8-5c0e-4a4b-a11e-feaad39f2bd0/download/smsf-annual-overview-2023-24.xlsx
[10] https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/2fd970ec-984e-4593-bbad-2e69a5fa7a89/resource/7a50c5c8-5c0e-4a4b-a11e-feaad39f2bd0/download/smsf-annual-overview-2023-24.xlsx
[11] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/g2jloagp/rep824-published-6-november-2025.pdf
[12] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/giving-financial-product-advice/tips-for-giving-self-managed-superannuation-fund-advice/

The post CPD: SMSF advice under the microscope – what REP 824 means for advisers appeared first on AdviserVoice.

Identify the key regulatory and consumer protection risks associated with managed accounts, including conflicts of interest, fee opacity and governance failures.

Introduction

The spectacular growth of managed accounts is arguably one of the most notable trends within financial advice over the last decade. Offering efficiency, consistency, and professional investment management at scale, managed accounts are essentially a form of outsourcing, allowing advisers to devote more time to client strategy and engagement. Little wonder then that almost 60 per cent of advisers now use managed accounts^[1], with an additional 16 per cent likely to use them in the future. In 2025, advisers directed an estimated 50% of new client inflows to separately managed accounts^[2], up from 41% in 2024, and reflecting their growing prominence as a primary investment structure.

But as the adoption of managed accounts has accelerated, so too has the concentration of risk. When thousands of clients are placed into centrally managed models, small design flaws, conflicts, or governance failures can be amplified across an entire client base, and – unsurprisingly – the managed account sector has attracted the attention of the corporate regulator.

Among the strategic priorities listed in ASIC’s 25/26 Corporate Plan^[3] is the surveillance of AFSLs offering managed accounts to retail clients. Focusing specifically on governance frameworks, management of conflicts of interest, and outcomes for consumers, ASIC commenced this surveillance in late 2025, issuing ‘please explain’ notices to licensees and separately managed account (SMA) providers, seeking information about any sales and revenue targets, inducements and benefits to offer SMAs to retail clients^[4].

For advisers, it is worth remembering that while outsourcing, delegating and automating investment management can deliver substantial benefits to both advisers and their clients, advisers cannot outsource their legal and ethical obligations, and ultimately remain personally responsible for their recommendations and associated outcomes.

This article examines how best-interest obligations, conflicts management, fee transparency, governance and client communication in the managed account environment are being scrutinised by ASIC, and what advisers must do to meet the regulator’s expectations while protecting client outcomes and their own compliance position.

Managed accounts explainer

A managed account is an investment structure where a client’s portfolio is managed to a defined investment strategy by a professional portfolio manager, rather than being constructed security-by-security by the adviser. Unlike a traditional managed fund, the client retains beneficial ownership of the underlying assets, meaning tax impacts are felt at an individual investor level. Day-to-day portfolio construction and rebalancing are handled centrally.

Within the broad managed account category, the two most common types are Separately Managed Accounts (SMAs) and Managed Discretionary Accounts (MDAs).

An off-the-shelf SMA applies a model portfolio to each client, with trades implemented automatically, in line with the pre-defined strategy. For clients with more to invest, tailored SMAs allow more bespoke portfolios. SMAs are offered by a wide range of providers, including fund managers, asset consultants, researchers, and licensees.

Whereas SMAs are financial products, a Managed Discretionary Account (MDA), is classed as a financial service. With MDAs, the adviser or portfolio manager has discretion to make investment decisions and execute trades on the client’s behalf without seeking approval for each transaction, subject to an agreed mandate. Advisers require separate licensing to be able to offer MDAs.

SMAs are the largest and fastest growing type of managed account, accounting for almost three times the Funds Under Management of MDAs and growing twice as fast^[5].

Why ASIC is worried about managed accounts – the spectre of vertical integration

Funds held in managed accounts have expanded at an annual average rate of around 24 per cent since 2019, swelling to more than $256 billion^[6] by mid-2025, more than three times the balance just five years earlier. Much of that growth has been driven by SMAs, with other managed account offerings – including MDAs and other services – also recording positive, but more muted, growth.

At the same time, the market has become increasingly fragmented, with more than 100 SMA providers and investment consultants operating in the space and the top five providers controlling only around 15 – 20 per cent of assets^[7]. That fragmentation, combined with rapid inflows, creates fertile ground for poor practices and conflicts of interest to emerge and persist and create widespread consumer harm.

A particular concern for ASIC is that many of these fragmented providers are also research houses, investment consultants, platform providers or advice groups, firms for whom independence and objectivity are foundational.

Vertical integration, house models and revenue-linked distribution arrangements all heighten the risk that commercial incentives – rather than client interests – drive portfolio recommendations. It is therefore telling that the first phase of ASICs surveillance, implemented in late 2025, involved data gathering around such targets and inducements.

And poor transparency

Poor transparency, around both fees and performance, is another ASIC concern.

The bespoke nature of some managed account portfolios has led some fund managers to claim that specific portfolio holdings represent intellectual property, and they are thus unwilling to disclose these details. This lack of publicly available standardised performance and look-through data for SMAs often leaves clients with no meaningful performance context for their advisers’ recommendations.

As a result, transparency, comparability and adviser accountability are all weakened, and advisers may be unable to demonstrate they’ve met their Best Interests Duty (BID) or to benchmark SMA outcomes against alternatives that might be available.

Fee opacity is also a major problem.

The managed account value chain can involve several parties, from the adviser and their licensee, through to asset consultants, fund managers, and platform providers. As a result, there are often layers of fees, some of which may be opaque to the end investor, and which further hamper comparability and assessments of value.

When fee structures are fragmented across platforms, model managers and advisers, even savvy clients can struggle to understand what they are paying and whether it represents fair value, undermining genuinely informed consent.

Industry bodies themselves have acknowledged this problem, and in early 2025, Adviser Ratings led the launch of the SMA Reporting Standard committee^[8], with the aim of bringing “unity and clarity” to fee reporting across the sector.

MDAs: when discretion changes the risk equation

Managed Discretionary Accounts (MDAs) introduce an additional layer of compliance and consumer-protection risk because they give advisers or portfolio managers the authority to transact on a client’s behalf without seeking approval for each trade. While this can improve efficiency and responsiveness, it also removes an important safeguard: the client’s ability to review and consent to individual investment decisions.

In an MDA, the client’s mandate becomes the primary control. If that mandate is too broad, poorly aligned to the client’s objectives, or not regularly reviewed, trades can be executed that are technically permitted but practically inappropriate. This increases the risk of best-interest breaches, particularly where market conditions change or client circumstances evolve.

The discretionary nature of MDAs also heightens conflict and governance risks.

Portfolio turnover, asset substitutions or shifts toward related-party investments can occur without immediate client visibility, making robust conflict controls, monitoring and audit trails essential. For ASIC, MDAs are therefore not simply another type of managed account, they are a structure that demands stronger oversight and more rigorous compliance discipline. (ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 179^[9] is dedicated entirely to MDAs).

The importance of conflicts-of- interest management

We described earlier the heightened scope for conflicts of interest across managed account providers, a scope which has clearly influenced the initial focus of ASIC’s surveillance. One of their first priorities will be to shine a spotlight on fees earned for administering managed accounts – legally a grey area – which they will do by examining all arrangements between licensees and third parties collaborating on SMA products. Recipients of the letters sent to SMA providers by ASIC in late 2025 told Professional Planner that the regulator has demanded to see all “contracts and correspondence” between them and SMA investment partners^[10].

ASIC expects licensees and advisers to maintain robust conflict-of-interest frameworks that go well beyond generic policy statements.  At a minimum, this should include a current and detailed conflict register that captures all relevant commercial, ownership and revenue-sharing relationships across the managed account value chain. It also requires documented controls that specify how those conflicts are to be managed, such as restrictions on house-product bias, independent investment committee oversight, and separation between research, product manufacturing and distribution functions.

Coincidentally, late 2025 saw ASIC issue an updated edition^[11] of its Regulatory Guide 181, (AFS Licensing: Managing Conflicts of Interest).

Key updates to RG 181 included:

• how the law applies to conflicts of interest, including the scope of the conflicts management obligation and links to other related obligations
• the types of conflicts AFS licensees should identify and manage
• the need for robust, tailored arrangements to manage conflicts
• practical steps for effective conflict management, and
• a non-exhaustive ‘catalogue’ of related legal obligations and information.

As detailed in RG 181, effective management of conflicts usually requires both disclosure AND control mechanisms. Simply disclosing to a client that a model is a ‘house’ product or that a platform receives a fee is not sufficient. ASIC expects to see evidence that advisers and licensees have assessed whether the conflict could influence the advice given and taken steps to ensure that the client’s interests remain paramount.

For advisers, this translates into a practical evidentiary burden. They must be able to demonstrate not only that conflicts were disclosed, but that they were considered when selecting a managed account for a client. This includes documenting why a particular model was chosen over alternatives, how related-party products were evaluated, and how the adviser satisfied themselves that the recommendation was not driven by commercial incentives. In the context of ASIC’s current surveillance, it is this trail of governance, control and independent judgement that will determine whether managed account advice stands up to regulatory scrutiny.

The BID challenge when using managed accounts

Even where portfolio construction and implementation are delegated to an SMA provider, the adviser remains responsible for ensuring that their advice is appropriate, and in the client’s best interests. In the same way ASIC has made it clear (especially via RG 175)^[12] that research ratings or APL inclusion are not a proxy for an adviser’s own due diligence, nor is the use of a widely offered model portfolio (in an SMA structure) a proxy for suitability or compliance with BID.

This creates a particular challenge in a managed account context. Because most off-the-shelf SMAs are designed for broad client segments rather than tailored to individual circumstances, there is an inherent risk that advisers will default to a broad-based solution without sufficiently interrogating whether the portfolio genuinely aligns with a specific client’s objectives, financial situation and needs.

In practice, this means advisers must be able to articulate and document why a particular managed account was selected for a particular client. That analysis should go beyond high-level risk profiling and include consideration of time horizon, income requirements, tax position, liquidity needs and any relevant client preferences. For example, a growth-oriented SMA that may be appropriate for a younger accumulator could be demonstrably unsuitable for a retiree drawing down income, even if both clients are categorised as ‘balanced’ under a risk-profiling tool.

Tax outcomes are another often-overlooked dimension. Because clients in SMAs retain beneficial ownership of the underlying assets, rebalancing and portfolio turnover can generate capital gains or losses at the individual level. Advisers therefore need to consider whether a particular model’s turnover, asset mix and rebalancing approach are consistent with a client’s tax position and broader financial strategy, rather than assuming those impacts are neutral.

Adviser accountability and governance

Adviser accountability for client outcomes means they cannot treat SMAs as ‘set and forget’ investment solutions. If a model drifts from its stated risk profile, if underlying holdings change materially, or if performance or volatility moves outside reasonable expectations, the adviser must be able to identify that shift and assess whether the portfolio remains suitable for the client. That obligation exists regardless of whether the change originated with a platform, model manager or investment committee.

For ASIC, the key question is not who made a change, but how it was governed. In a file review, the regulator will likely look for evidence that the adviser was aware of model changes, understood their impact, and considered whether the portfolio remained appropriate. Statements such as ‘the model provider did it’ will not be sufficient. What will be important is whether the adviser and licensee had systems in place to detect changes, assess their relevance for the client, and act when necessary.

What ASIC will expect to see: a practical compliance framework for advisers

Much of their appeal of managed accounts lies in their efficiency benefits, and indeed 2025 research suggests that advisers can save up to 24 hours per week by using them with their clients^[13].

Managed accounts offer risk management benefits also – centralised portfolio management allows all clients to be treated equally, and outsourcing to professional investment managers increases the likelihood of better client outcomes, including performance and reduced volatility.

But as already explained, this does not mean managed accounts are risk free from an adviser perspective.

ASIC will seek to test whether advisers and licensees have the systems, documentation and governance in place to demonstrate that managed account recommendations are made and maintained in clients’ best interests.

Evidence they will likely look for includes the monitoring of material changes to asset allocation, underlying investments, risk profile, performance relative to benchmarks, and total costs. They will also expect advisers to demonstrate they are tracking events such as rebalancing, portfolio turnover and substitutions that may have tax or risk implications for individual clients.

Certain events should trigger an adviser review rather than being left to run automatically. These include sustained underperformance, significant changes to the model strategy, increases in fees, shifts in volatility, or changes in a client’s personal circumstances. ASIC is unlikely to be satisfied if a client remains in a model for years without any documented reassessment of whether it remains appropriate.

Red flags that will invite ASIC scrutiny:

• Use of house models by default, without documented comparison to alternatives
• Related-party products dominating the portfolio
• Fee increases or layering that are not clearly explained
• Model changes not reflected in client files
• High portfolio turnover without analysis of tax implications
• Persistent underperformance without action
• Inconsistent or missing performance data
• No independent oversight of model governance

When assessing a model provider, advisers should understand:

• Who owns and controls the model?
• What conflicts exist and how are they managed?
• How often is the model reviewed and by whom?
• How are performance and fees reported?
• What happens when the model changes?

Client files should contain evidence of:

• Why this model was selected for this client
• How alternatives were considered
• How conflicts were assessed
• How fees and risks were explained
• How ongoing suitability is monitored

In the current environment, it is this combination of monitoring, documentation and independent judgement that will determine whether managed account advice meets regulatory expectations.

Conclusion

Managed accounts have become one of the most powerful tools in modern advice, delivering scale, efficiency and access to professional portfolio management. But as their use has grown, so too have the risks that arise when investment decisions are centralised, commercial incentives are layered, and clients are increasingly removed from day-to-day portfolio activity. ASIC’s inclusion of sector surveillance among its strategic priorities makes clear that managed accounts are no longer being treated as a low-risk implementation choice, but as complex structures that demands strong governance, rigorous conflict management and ongoing client-level oversight.

For advisers, the message is clear. The automation and delegation benefits of managed accounts do not reduce accountability – they heighten it. Those who can demonstrate disciplined monitoring, independent judgement and clear client communication will continue to reap the benefits of managed accounts, even in the face of amplified regulatory and consumer risks.

Take the FAAA accredited quiz to earn 0.5 CPD hour:

CPD Quiz

The following CPD quiz is accredited by the FAAA at 0.5 hour.

Legislated CPD Area: Regulatory Compliance & Consumer Protection (0.5 hrs)

ASIC Knowledge Requirements: Managed Investments (0.5 hrs)

please log in to start this quiz

———

References:
[1] https://www.ifa.com.au/democratisation-of-wealth-nearly-3-in-5-advisers-utilising-managed-accounts
[2] https://financialnewswire.com.au/funds-management/3-in-5-australian-advisers-now-using-managed-accounts/
[3] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/xbtjrb4m/asic-corporate-plan-2025-26-published-27-august-2025.pdf
[4] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2025/11/asic-kicks-off-probe-into-sma-conflicts-of-interest
[5] https://www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/conflicts-poor-transparency-riddle-the-256b-managed-account-market-20260102-p5nr6a
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] https://www.ifa.com.au/adviser-ratings-leads-launch-of-sma-reporting-standard-framework/
[9] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/regulatory-guides/rg-179-managed-discretionary-accounts/
[10] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2025/11/asic-kicks-off-probe-into-sma-conflicts-of-interest
[11] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/ebykrtdj/rg181-published-16-december-2025.pdf
[12] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/pqpe0hwc/rg175-published-21-november-2024-20241219.pdf
[13] https://www.ssga.com/au/en_gb/intermediary/insights/investment-trends-managed-account-report

The post CPD: Managed Accounts in the ASIC spotlight – compliance essentials for advisers appeared first on AdviserVoice.

What is the practical guidance on due diligence, communication, and client protection when advising on private credit offerings?

Private credit is booming, and advisers are playing a big part in its growth.

A sector that was valued at around $133 billion^[1] in size in 2021 had grown to $224 billion^[2] in assets under management by 2025, an increase of almost 70 per cent in four years, catalysed by a lending pull back by banks, more generous credit underwriting, and investor appetite for income solutions with higher potential returns than traditional vehicles.

Investors can gain access to private credit exposure through various direct and indirect channels, with major investors including superannuation funds, and domestic and international asset managers. Some SMSFs and family offices have also accessed the sector directly.

Financial advisers are a major driver of this growth too, with around a third of advisers regularly allocating to the asset class, and a further 27 per cent having done so on an ‘opportunistic basis’^[3].

But for all the buzz about private credit, black clouds loom on the horizon, with ASIC flagging major concerns about governance and disclosure failures it has observed among private credit providers. Their concern levels, articulated via two recently released reports – and underscored by a recent high-profile action against a provider of ‘term deposit style’ cash accounts – proved significant enough for them to announce private credit as one of their enforcement priorities^[4] for 2026.

The sector is characterised by a wide variety of business models and structures, spanning credit contracts through to managed investment schemes. This in turn means the overarching compliance and disclosure framework can be a patchwork quilt of different acts and codes, making it harder for ASIC to regulate the sector and for participants to know what rules apply and when.

While private credit is far from an unregulated ‘wild west’, there is no doubt that a question mark hangs over the sector, with the failings of a few tainting the many. And whenever ASIC decides to take a look, extra vigilance on the part of advisers is advisable.

In this article, we will explore the world of private credit, examine the findings of ASICs surveillance of the sector, summarise the relevant obligations for advisers, and provide practical guidance for advisers to navigate the sector more confidently and compliantly.

What is private credit and how does it work?

Private credit refers to loans and debt investments made by non-bank institutions, often directly to businesses, property developers, or projects that fall outside traditional lending channels. These loans are typically originated and held by private credit managers. For borrowers they can allow access to funding that be hard to secure through banks. For investors they can offer access to yields that are usually higher than traditional fixed income products.

Unlike public bonds, private credit arrangements are often bespoke, involving direct negotiations between borrower and lender. Investment structures in the sector vary widely and can include:

• Pooled managed investment schemes (MIS)
• Listed or unlisted credit trusts
• Wholesale-only offerings available to sophisticated investors
• Retail credit funds, sometimes accessed through wealth platforms

Underlying loans might be secured or unsecured, and may relate to commercial real estate, small-to-medium enterprise (SME) lending, or asset-backed lending.

Many private credit offerings present themselves with features familiar to clients, for example ‘monthly income,’ ‘fixed term,’ or ‘secured’, but which can mask significant variations in liquidity, valuation practices, and credit risk.

For advisers, this means not all private credit products are created equal. Different offerings carry different fee structures, redemption mechanics, default handling procedures, and governance controls. Moreover, because the sector is not under a unified regulatory framework, disclosure obligations, trustee oversight, and reporting vary markedly across products.

The sector’s growing popularity, combined with patchy transparency and inconsistent disclosure, is precisely what has drawn the regulator’s focus. Advisers must therefore not only understand how private credit works but also ensure their clients do too, in language that makes the risks and trade-offs clear.

What ASIC ‘s observations of the private credit sector revealed

In the latter part of 2025, ASIC released two major reports into the growing private credit sector: a market review^[5] (Report 814) and surveillance findings^[6] (Report 820).

These investigations uncovered systemic issues in governance, transparency, and investor protection, highlighting that key segments of the market, especially those targeting retail and wholesale investors, present substantial enough regulatory concerns to warrant elevated scrutiny.

One core observation relates to conflicts of interest and misaligned remuneration.

In Rep 814, ASIC flagged widespread practices where managers retain borrower-paid fees (e.g. upfront, arrangement, or default fees) while also charging management fees to investors. In some instances, these borrower fees were not disclosed at all or were understated, raising concerns about true manager remuneration. These practices potentially create a conflict between investor’s best interests and manager incentives.

Valuation practices were another key area of concern. Many funds, especially those exposed to real estate construction and development, lacked independent quarterly valuations. Some used outdated valuations, or valuations generated internally or by related parties, undermining objectivity. Methodological inconsistencies were also uncovered:

“There is lack of clarity on whether LVR is based on cost, current value or forecast completion value. Some development sites purchased in 2021–22 are now lower in value due to building cost inflation of more than 20%. If funds are still using a 2021–22 valuation or original LVR, that value could be misleading.” ASIC Rep 814.

Across the two reports, ASIC also drew attention to portfolio opacity, finding some funds did not provide adequate disclosure about non-performing loans, credit concentration, or whether income distributions were being funded from borrower repayments, interest, or capital drawdowns. In some instances, distributions appeared unnaturally smooth given the underlying asset risk, suggestive of possible return engineering.

Terminology misuse further compounded investor misunderstanding. ASIC warned that this could give retail investors a false sense of safety, as demonstrated by the poorly understood distinction between a ‘term deposit’ and a ‘term account’. The similarity of labelling would lead many to conclude – reasonably – that they were the same, characterised by rock solid security and a government guarantee. But that is only true of term deposits. Many term accounts – including some popular with advisers – are far less secure and have underlying assets that are a mix of cash, residential mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities. As one analyst observed:

“[The conflation of the phrases is a deliberate marketing ploy.] The audience is not sufficiently literate to understand the risk-reward trade-off.” Ben Walsh, JP Morgan^[7].

Just as ASIC has previously cautioned advisers about relying too heavily on research ratings, an emerging theme – also echoed in the Shield and First Guardian cases – is that advisers cannot rely on the ability to access an offering via a platform as indicative of suitability or endorsement.

Similarly, advisers shouldn’t rely on TMD documents as a substitute for their own due diligence. In a recent high-profile ASIC Stop Order, the provider’s description of the target market and investment timeframe was found to be problematic, as it did not reflect the risks associated with the underlying investment.

These findings underscore the need for financial advisers to exercise heightened vigilance when recommending private credit, especially to retail clients. Transparency, clear communication, and discussion about risks and trade-offs take on extra importance, as does doing their own thorough investigations about suitability.

Risks and regulatory considerations for advisers

The disparate regulatory landscape in private credit can be challenging to navigate. Sometimes the easiest approach is to go back to basics and revisit the foundational legal and ethical obligations applying to financial advisers, regardless of the product solution.

At the centre of course is the best interest duty, articulated in s961B of the Corporations Act, and requiring advisers to actively investigate and recommend only those products that are appropriate to the client’s needs, financial objectives, and risk tolerance. This includes considering product structure, liquidity, concentration risk, and valuation practices – areas where ASIC has found considerable variation among private credit funds.

Staying with the Corporations Act, and s961G, requires advice to be based on reasonable grounds, supported by due diligence that goes beyond high-level product summaries or ratings. ASIC has specifically cautioned advisers against over-reliance on external research houses, noting in REP 779:

“[Advisers] should be careful not to over-rely on advice licensee product approvals or external research ratings.” ASIC Report 779^[8].

The assumption that platform-listed private credit products are vetted or low-risk has effectively been debunked by ASIC. When it comes to assessing product suitability, access and research ratings must not replace adviser due diligence and judgement.

Unfortunately, whereas many retail investment and risk offerings are homogeneous, allowing a degree of efficiency when advisers are comparing options, private credit offerings are characterised by much more variability in structure, complexity, and liquidity. Due diligence around such products is therefore likely to be a far more demanding task, where a wider range of disclosures and documents needs to be scrutinised.

The Adviser Code of Ethics^[9] also reinforces these expectations. Several standards seem particularly relevant when it comes to private credit:

• Standard 2: requires advisers to act with integrity and in the best interests of each client – which demands a genuine understanding of the product, not just reliance on platform status or external ratings.
• Standard 5: compels advisers to ensure clients understand the advice and its consequences. Given ASIC’s concerns around investor confusion, especially with terms like ‘term investment’ or ‘secured’, this requires clear and proactive risk explanation.
• Standard 6: directs advisers to consider the client’s broader long-term interests and circumstances. Given the appeal of cash and income products to older, more risk intolerant investors, helping them understand how illiquid or opaque private credit exposures may affect liquidity, income reliability, and risk, seems especially critical.
• Standard 7: mandates that any remuneration or benefits received by the adviser or licensee must not compromise the client’s best interest. This is important given ASIC observations about opaque fee structures on private credit funds, which may act to incentivise product recommendations inconsistent with client objectives.

Ultimately, ASIC’s position is clear: regulatory attention is intensifying, and advisers who engage with private credit must not only understand these products in detail, but also explain them clearly, recommend them judiciously, and document their advice process thoroughly.

Wholesale v retail – the misclassification traps

Some private credit offerings are only available on a wholesale basis and herein lies another trap for advisers – the misclassification of investors as wholesale instead of retail. Classifying a client as wholesale just to access certain products, without assessing whether this aligns with their understanding, needs, and risk profile, may breach best interests’ duty. ASIC commentary in relation to the wholesale investor test, including their 2024 submission to treasury^[10], reinforces the idea that meeting the test does not automatically mean the product or service is appropriate for that client and licensees must still ensure suitability and capacity.

Practical adviser guidance: due diligence client protection

As ASIC scrutiny intensifies around private credit, financial advisers must ensure robust due diligence and demonstrate alignment with client best interests. The diversity and complexity of these products mean that generic filters or assumptions such as platform access or model portfolio inclusion are not defensible demonstrations of professional analysis and judgement. Here is a simplified checklist of steps for advisers to navigate the complex landscape of private credit in a compliant, client focused way:

Product investigation and analysis

Before recommending a private credit fund, advisers should probe for specifics around:

• Asset types: Are loans secured? What sectors or geographies are being financed?
• Borrower screening: How are borrowers assessed for creditworthiness and covenant strength?
• Impairment policies: How are late payments or defaults reported and managed?
• Liquidity terms: Are redemptions gated, delayed, or subject to notice periods?
• Valuation processes: Are valuations independent, current, and transparent?
• Fees and expenses: Are there performance fees, withdrawal penalties, or hidden layers?

ASIC’s findings in REP 814 and REP 820 revealed provider performance in these areas to be variable and deserving of extra attention.

Assessing client fit

Private credit offerings can be complex and are often wrongly assumed to share the same risk and liquidity characteristics of traditional cash and income products. This means advisers must pay particular attention to assessing:

• Risk tolerance: Are clients prepared for potential delays, volatility, or capital loss?
• Time horizon: Does the investment suit clients who may need liquidity?
• Income expectations: Is the return steady, variable, or contingent on performance?
• Experience: Does the client understand credit products and how they differ from deposits?

Special caution is needed for SMSF holders and retirees, who may overestimate capital security based on familiar terminology like ‘term investment.’

Documentation and client communication

ASIC expects advisers to:

• Record analysis showing why the product suits the client’s profile and goals
• Evidence informed consent, including communication around risks, illiquidity, and volatility
• Avoid opaque language or excessive reliance on PDS extracts; use plain English and visual aids where appropriate

AFCA will not hesitate to examine whether the client truly understood the nature of the investment, even in wholesale contexts.

Ongoing monitoring

Beyond initial implementation, advisers should continue to monitor:

• Redemption delays, limits, or suspension (gate notices)
• Portfolio concentration drift
• Changes in fund governance or valuation methods
• Emerging liquidity or performance risks
• Client life events that may shift investment suitability

Red flags to watch out for

ASIC Reports 814, 820, along with their recent enforcement activities and media commentary, can also be distilled into a handy table of red flags and implications, giving advisers directional guidance around what to look out for when assessing private credit products:

Conclusion

Private credit is no longer a niche category, it has moved into the mainstream, with platforms, model portfolios, and advisory recommendations helping drive a multi-billion-dollar sector. But that growth has shone a light on the sector’s complexity and opacity, resulting in increased regulator concern. ASIC’s reports and enforcement actions make clear that advisers cannot assume product integrity based on platform access or research ratings alone. In an environment where fund structures, risk disclosures, and liquidity mechanisms vary widely, advisers must pay extra attention to their due diligence, communication, and documentation around private credit recommendations.

This is not to say the sector should be avoided: on the contrary there are many quality providers giving clients the opportunity to access income products that work harder than traditional vehicles (albeit with higher risk).

And for every risk highlighted in ASIC’s reviews, there is a practical adviser response, in terms of questions to ask, red flags to recognise, and conversations to have with clients.

With private credit now firmly on the regulator’s radar, this is a moment for advisers to assess their approach and arm themselves with the tools that can help reinforce their professionalism and expertise and deliver better outcomes for their clients.

Take the FAAA accredited quiz to earn 0.5 CPD hour:

CPD Quiz

The following CPD quiz is accredited by the FAAA at 0.5 hour.

Legislated CPD Area: Regulatory Compliance & Consumer Protection (0.5 hrs)

ASIC Knowledge Requirements: Regulatory Environment (0.5 hrs)

please log in to start this quiz

———–

References:
[1] https://axis.ausiex.com.au/articles/increased-interest-in-private-credit-as-inflation-takes-off/
[2] https://www.investordaily.com.au/markets/58101-private-credit-surges-past-224bn
[3] https://www.moneymanagement.com.au/news/funds-management/how-high-advisers-private-credit-usage-amid-asic-concerns
[4] https://www.moneymanagement.com.au/news/financial-planning/asic-flags-private-credit-misconduct-among-2026-enforcement-priorities
[5] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-814-private-credit-in-australia/
[6] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-820-private-credit-surveillance-report-retail-and-wholesale-surveillance/
[7] https://www.afr.com/wealth/investing/why-one-word-really-matters-when-it-comes-to-private-credit-20250922-p5mwx2
[8] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/dmifq31x/rep779-published-21-february-2024.pdf
[9] https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2019L00117/latest/text
[10] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/hxrizoei/202405-submission-no-62-wholesale-investor-and-wholesale-client-tests.pdf

The post CPD: Private credit advice in 2026 – compliance and consumer protection essentials appeared first on AdviserVoice.

Advisers need to understand how DDO applies beyond product issuers, the importance of aligning advice with Target Market Determinations, how to identify and report significant dealings outside the target market, and why robust documentation and governance are essential to meeting ASIC’s expectations under the DDO regime.

For legislation pigeonholed by many observers as being ‘all about product manufacturers’, the Design and Distribution Obligations (DDO) laws certainly have a knack of worming their way into financial advisers’ lives.

Recent ASIC ‘Stop Orders’ placed on the term accounts offered by one very high-profile local institution^[1] didn’t just fray the nerves of investors, it caused grief for unsuspecting advisers and lead many to rethink their whole appetite for private credit. (It also reinforced that term accounts and term deposits are not the same thing, and that the distinction matters).

Go back just a short time and it can be seen, ASIC have also placed similar orders on the income fund of a local manager^[2], and the disability insurance product of a well-known life insurer^[3], both scenarios in which advisers may not have been penalised but were certainly impacted. Advisers were also likely reminded that – as distributors – they too have strict behavioural, procedural, and reporting obligations under DDO, the lack of adherence to which can result in penalties.

Throw in ASIC’s late 2024 report into distributor compliance with the legislation (and subsequent guidance tweaks) and it is clear that much has been happening on the DDO front, making it timely to revisit DDO through an adviser lens.

This article will give readers an understanding of the origins and purpose of the legislation, the impacts for advisers, a timeline on key events and subsequent changes, and a practical adviser checklist to assume ongoing DDO compliance and awareness.

DDO: a consumer protection gamechanger

Although disclosure is generally regarded as one of the key pillars of financial consumer protection, there has for some time been a recognition that an over-reliance on disclosure can be harmful to consumers, who generally lack the knowledge and bandwidth to comprehend lengthy disclosure documents and then make complex choices. This recognition was one of the catalysts for the game-changing DDO regime, which requires firms to take a consumer-centric approach to designing and distributing financial products.

Coming into effect in October 2021, the origins of the design and distribution obligations regime can be traced all the way back to the 2014 Financial Systems Inquiry, which proposed a ‘principles-based product design and distribution obligation’^[4].

By the time the DDO legislation was eventually passed in 2019 (with an extended ‘phasing in’ period’), its form had been strongly inspired by the UK’s MiFID ii laws^[5], which were designed to ensure financial products were only manufactured and distributed when they were in the best interests of consumers.

In simple terms, DDO is a continuous feedback loop

The theory underpinning DDO is relatively simple:

• Product issuers ensure they only manufacture products for whom there is a clearly defined target market
• That target market is formally articulated via a Target Market Determination, (TMD) document
  • Similarly, articulating who isn’t in the target market may be appropriate, although this is not mandatory
• Distributors (including AFSLs and their authorised representatives) provide data to issuers that help them assess whether the product design – or the definition of the target market – needs to change, and
• Issuers, in turn, provide data to ASIC, for them to assess the appropriateness of products and product categories.

Direct impacts on Financial Advisers

From a practical perspective, DDO impacted AFSLs and Authorised Representatives in several ways, mainly centred around the use of TMDs and reporting to product issuers.

TMD requirements

• Ensure a valid, current TMD exists for every retail product before recommending, issuing, or arranging it.
• Understand and apply each TMD’s parameters, including the product’s intended consumer, risk tolerance, and distribution conditions.
• Integrate TMD checks into advice and compliance processes (fact-finds, paraplanning, file reviews, and CRM workflows).
• Cease distribution immediately if:
  • The product has no TMD, or
  • The TMD is withdrawn or subject to an ASIC stop order
• Dealings outside target markets
  • Record any cases where a product is recommended to a person outside the defined target audience
• Reporting to the issuer (generally within 10 days of a pre-defined date)
  • ‘Significant’ dealings outside the target audience
  • Product related complaints
  • Other distribution data as required by the product issuer.

Reporting burden becomes a point of contention

AFSL reporting requirements associated with the DDO added to extensive list of ASIC reporting requirements, including breach data and Internal Dispute Resolution (complaints) data, and unsurprisingly have been the subject of much criticism.

Furthermore, the vague guidance associated with some aspects of these requirements – the threshold for ‘significant dealings’ for example – further compounded the stress and workload for advisers and licensees, many of whom naturally err on the side of overcompliance.

Significant dealings: when is significant really significant?

Neither the Corporations Act nor RG 274 define ‘significant’, with ASIC simply giving a list of considerations for advisers to weigh up in making this judgement themselves.

These considerations, from paras 160 and 161 of RG 274, are shown below:

The profession advocates for change

Strong lobbying from the advice profession was successful in effecting change after the DDO legislation had been passed, when relief was granted (via ASIC instrument 2021/784) from the obligation for distributors to report to product issuers if they received nil complaints during a reporting period. ASIC consulted^[7] on extending this relief in 2023, and at the time of writing it remained in place.

Michelle Levy also took aim at the requirements in her Quality of Advice Review recommendations^[8], noting that product issuers, by specifying their own reporting needs, were effectively being allowed to impose legal obligations on distributors (including financial advisers) at will. Recommendation 12.2 proposed:

Amend the DDO reporting requirements in the Corporations Act to remove the requirement for relevant providers to:

• report significant dealings outside the target market to the product issuer
• comply with the additional reporting obligations specified by the product issuer in the target market determination, and
• report to the product issuer where there have been no complaints during the specified reporting period. 

Unfortunately, this recommendation was not addressed in either Tranche 1 or 2 of the Delivering Better Financial Outcomes (DBFO) legislation (which dealt with most of her other recommendations) and so for the foreseeable future the reporting burden remains.

2023: ASIC releases its first report into DDO compliance

In May 2023, ASIC released Report 762, Design and Distribution Obligations: Investment Products, which found that there was “significant room for improvement” in DDO compliance^[9].

At the time of publishing Rep 762, ASIC had already issued 26 interim stop orders, identifying several recurring themes in these actions. The most common included mismatched risk profiles, inappropriate investment timeframes or withdrawal conditions, overly broad target markets, and weak or absent distribution conditions. Some TMDs also suggested investors allocate excessively high portions of their portfolios to single products, raising suitability and diversification concerns.

To advisers, ASIC’s concerns were undoubtedly a red flag, a reminder about the need to conduct their own due diligence when assessing the underlying characteristics of a product, and its suitability for a client.

In other words, don’t solely rely on the TMD when matching clients to products.

2024: ASIC’s second report on DDO compliance

In September 2024, ASIC released its second comprehensive analysis of DDO compliance^[10].

Report 795, Design and distribution obligations: Compliance with the reasonable steps obligation looked at 19 issuers of high-risk investment, insurance and credit products between October 2023 and August 2024.

A particular focus of this report was the distribution of products, including via advisers, with ASIC noting many issuers exhibited limited due-diligence and oversight of third-party distributors.

“Where personal advice was a selected distribution method, we observed that issuers took minimal steps to check customers actually received the advice before acquiring the product,” ASIC said in the report.^[11]

“We acknowledge that in some circumstances an issuer will be unable to review the personal advice (e.g. if there are privacy concerns).”

This is despite issuers having clear guidance under Regulatory Guide 274 Product design and distribution obligations, ASIC added, that they can rely on a certification from the adviser that the client received current advice.

“However, we did not observe any issuers seeking such certification, although one issuer sought the adviser’s contact and AFS licensee details,” the regulator said.

The report recommended that issuers need to improve distribution practices, including in the selection and supervision of distributors (prompting concerns that issuers would hit advisers with further documentary requirements).

Overall, the report signalled that DDO oversight has moved from education to enforcement, with ASIC expecting demonstrable, data-driven assurance that distribution genuinely aligns with each product’s target market.

Following the release of Rep 795, ASIC also released minor updates to RG 274^[12], including a strengthening of the ‘appropriateness’ requirement. ASIC revised this requirement to ensure product issuers had strong documented evidence showing they had applied an objective test when determining the appropriateness of the product to the target market. They further stipulated that this test could not be satisfied by simply including information in the TMD (as was previously allowed).

ASIC’s recent high-profile stop order puts distribution conditions in focus

Earlier in this article we mentioned how ASIC had placed a stop order on the high-profile issuer of a term account known to be very popular with advisers. Among the actions demanded by ASIC to lift the order were changes to the TMD, including:

• The addition of a distribution condition requiring investors to either receive personal financial advice, or to complete a questionnaire proving suitability, and
• The defining of a ‘negative target market’ (investors for whom the product was not suited.

Interestingly, and consistent with the concerns ASIC expressed in Report 795, it seems the issuer’s supervision of those distribution conditions was perhaps less rigorous than it could have been, as the AFR reported^[13].

Does DDO ever come up in AFCA determinations against advisers?

AFCA determination 12-00-954693, handed down in August 2024, demonstrated that the complaints body does see the TMD as a critical reference point within the advice process^[14].

The complaint arose after an adviser used their discretion under a managed discretionary account (MDA) to invest a retired couple’s SMSF in a small-cap growth fund that sat outside their agreed investment universe and risk profile. The fund’s TMD stated it was unsuitable for investors seeking income, and the clients’ SOA and objectives prioritised regular income and capital stability. When the clients later reviewed their portfolio and saw the fund’s volatility and limited income yield, they questioned how it aligned with their stated goals, leading to a formal complaint that the adviser had acted beyond their authority and outside the agreed parameters (the adviser claimed the investment was appropriate within the broader portfolio mix).

In finding in favour of the complainant, AFCA effectively drew a line between product governance and advice suitability:

1. At the product (DDO/TMD) level:
   • If the adviser had used the TMD as the basis for distribution, they would indeed have concluded the fund wasn’t suitable, since income-seeking clients fall outside the defined target market
   • So, relying on the TMD would have led them not to invest in the fund (and doing so constituted an off-target dealing).
2. At the personal advice level:
   • AFCA accepted that, within the context of a diversified portfolio, a small exposure to a growth fund could still be consistent with the overall investment strategy and not cause financial harm
   • However, there was still a procedural failure in that the adviser still acted outside the documented investment parameters and without updated client consent.

So, while AFCA found that within the context of the clients’ overall portfolio, the fund in question was reasonable – mitigating the amount of harm – this didn’t excuse the breach of authority by the adviser, and compensation was still ordered.

The takeout for advisers from this case include:

• The TMD governs product-level suitability, not portfolio-level advice
• Advisers must first ask: “Is my client inside the defined target market for this product?” If not, it may trigger a significant dealing report
• Even if, in portfolio terms, an exposure seems reasonable, you can’t override the TMD conflict without explicit client consent and an advice record

Productivity roundtable:  Treasury to consult on simplifying DDO

In September 2025, it was announced^[15] that ASIC had written to the Treasurer, nominating the DDO as one of the areas worth exploring in terms of bolstering productivity and economic growth. The letter noted that, in addition to ongoing discussions with Treasury about changes to the reportable situations regime, “other law reform ideas that have been raised… include reforms to the design and distribution obligations, product disclosure requirements, and simplification of the liability regime in the Corporations Act.”

A practical checklist for adviser/licensee DDO compliance

Advisers are all too familiar with the glacial pace of legislative change, and so in the meantime must continue to comply with DDO laws as they currently stand. In this context, the checklist below may prove a handy reference point:

Summary

The article explores how the DDO regime, rather than purely targeting product manufacturers, is a critical area of compliance for financial advisers. It traces DDO’s origins from the 2014 Financial System Inquiry through to its 2021 commencement, explaining its goal of ensuring products are designed and sold to suitable consumers. ASIC’s two major reviews of DDO compliance (Reports 762 and 795) revealed weak governance, over-reliance on templates, and poor oversight of distributors, prompting them to sharpen their focus. This heightened scrutiny was brought to a head in September 2025, with the issuing of a stop order on a high-profile term account, popular with advisers.

For advisers, the takeaway is that TMDs should not be relied upon as the sole method for determining product suitability. ASIC expects advisers to apply their own due diligence, document client suitability beyond the issuer’s target market, and report significant dealings to product issuers. With ASIC now firmly in ‘enforcement phase’ with regards to DDO, advisers should take extra care to embed TMD checks, distribution reporting, and record-keeping into their compliance frameworks while awaiting any longer-term simplification through ASIC’s proposed DDO review.

Take the FAAA accredited quiz to earn 0.5 CPD hour:

CPD Quiz

The following CPD quiz is accredited by the FAAA at 0.5 hour.

Legislated CPD Area: Regulatory Compliance & Consumer Protection (0.5 hrs)

ASIC Knowledge Requirements: Regulatory Environment (0.5 hrs)

please log in to start this quiz

———–

References:
[1] https://www.news.com.au/finance/business/banking/regulator-freezes-115bn-in-funds-at-la-trobe-financial-leaving-aussies-in-dark/news-story/144f3ac0a8c9ffa71b1ea1ef85ea3f24
[2] https://www.moneymanagement.com.au/news/funds-management/asic-clamps-down-australian-unity
[3] https://www.investmentmagazine.com.au/2023/07/clearview-hit-with-ddo-stop-order/
[4] https://treasury.gov.au/publication/c2014-fsi-final-report
[5] https://www.moneymanagement.com.au/features/expert-analysis/design-and-distribution-obligations-putting-consumer-first
[6] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/etgm1amc/rg274-published-10-september-2024.pdf
[7] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/consultations/cs-1-extending-design-and-distribution-obligations-instrument/
[8] https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-01/p2023-358632.pdf
[9] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2023-releases/23-115mr-asic-calls-on-investment-product-issuers-to-lift-their-game-on-design-and-distribution-obligations/
[10] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-795-design-and-distribution-obligations-compliance-with-the-reasonable-steps-obligation/
[11] https://www.ifa.com.au/news/34751-asic-flags-advice-checks-among-ddo-failures
[12] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/nv3oqcdb/attachment-to-rg274-published-10-september-2024.pdf
[13] https://www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/la-t robe-vs-asic-how-a-single-word-settled-the-stop-order-stoush-20250925-p5mxvs
[14] https://my.afca.org.au/searchpublisheddecisions/
[15] https://financialnewswire.com.au/financial-planning/ddo-regime-up-for-simplification/

The post CPD: DDO wake-up call – what ASIC crackdown means for advisers appeared first on AdviserVoice.

Advisers need to be able to explain the difference between disclosure and true informed consent.

Introduction

Few issues are as central to effective, compliant financial advice as informed consent.

Aside from being a foundational element of financial consumer protection, clients who understand the advice they receive are more likely to appreciate the value of that advice, are less likely to complain about it, and are likely to demonstrate higher levels of satisfaction and loyalty.

On the flipside, when truly informed consent is absent, trust is lost and consumers are at greater risk of financial harm, with no example being more powerful than the recent collapse of the First Guardian and Shield superannuation funds^[1].

Among the many aspects of this scandal being scrutinised is a so-called “negative consent” model under which clients were sent Records of Advice (ROAs) proposing to switch super into new funds, with instructions that ‘silence or failure to respond’ would be taken as consent^[2]. Unsurprisingly, Regulators, licensees, and consumer advocates have raised profound concerns about whether such practices meet the legal and ethical standard of informed consent.

For advisers, this moment is a learning opportunity. It forces the profession to revisit what informed consent really means, how it should be evidenced, and why it matters not only for compliance but also for long-term client confidence.

In this article, we will examine the concept of informed consent, and how it differs from mere disclosure. The regulatory approach to informed consent will be explored, including requirements around advice documents and fee consents. Emerging consent challenges, including those involving AI and vulnerable clients will also be examined. Advisers will ultimately be given a practical framework for evidencing client understanding, to help them deliver more compliant, effective, and valued advice.

Informed consent as a consumer protection

The concept of informed consent – so central to compliant advice – is borne out of the knowledge asymmetry that automatically exists in over 99% of adviser – client relationships. The client, by virtue of their comparative lack of knowledge about increasingly complex financial products and regulations, is immediately at a disadvantage in any advice interaction, and would be vulnerable to that knowledge gap being exploited.

In financial advice, a range of consent requirements ensure that the client understands and consents to:

• the advice being given
• the scope of that advice (including what is out of scope)
• the information that advice is based upon
• the costs associated with the advice and any product/switching related fees
• the risks associated with that advice
• the redress mechanisms available to them
• the remuneration the adviser will receive and any potential conflicts.

Failure to satisfy any one of these requirements – even inadvertently – increases the risk that the advice is not in the client’s best interests and increases the likelihood of consumer harm and client complaints.

Case Studies – AFCA determinations

Lack of informed consent features prominently in complaints to AFCA, with a common theme being the misclassification of investor risk profiles.

In case number 495186 for example, a client was misclassified as a growth investor. While the husband (Mr V) agreed with the record in the Statement of Advice (SOA) that he wished to retire at 60, Mrs V disagreed with the SOA recording that she also wished to retire at 60. According to Mrs V she had always expressed a desire to retire at age 55. Shortening the investment time frame by 5 years had a material impact on the appropriate risk profile for that client, and AFCA (FOS) upheld the client’s complaint (about investment losses) on the basis that the advice was not appropriate and while consent was obtained (in the form of an Authority to Proceed), informed consent was not^[3].

Similarly, in case number 12-00-1028323, AFCA found against a firm whose advice resulted in a client being ‘significantly overexposed to growth assets’. In their published determination, AFCA noted:

“[The clients] were still overexposed to growth assets and risk by following this advice. This placed a higher duty of responsibility on [the adviser] Mr VC to ensure he explained those investments and risks to the complainants in a way they could understand. It is not clear to the panel the complainants undertook this this additional risk with prior informed consent.”^[4]

Noddy syndrome – informed consent, or just consent?

Advisers can’t rely on the fact they disclosed something, or that the client signed something, as evidence of informed consent. Here the concept of ‘Noddy syndrome,’ perhaps best encapsulates the difference between informed consent and mere consent. Noddy syndrome is a term coined by Dr. John Lloyd, a consultant neuropsychiatrist specialising in elderly care. In a 2009 court case – Nicholson v Knaggs – Lloyd described how he used the term to explain the tendency of elderly individuals to simply agree with suggestions to avoid causing trouble or inconvenience^[5].

Informed consent: the legal and ethical obligations

While consent is about ‘permission’, informed consent is about permission AND genuine client understanding, and the obligations on advisers to facilitate and evidence this understanding are comprehensively reinforced – explicitly and implicitly – across the Corporations Act, multiple ASIC guidance documents, and the Code of Ethics.

The Corporations Act

Several parts of s 961 of the Corporations Act^[6] implicitly underpin the concept of informed consent, including:

• s 961B: Best interests’ duty
  Advisers must “act in the best interests of the client in relation to the advice”. While 961B does not use the phrases ‘informed consent’ or ‘client understanding’, the wording around the Safe Harbour test makes clear that acting in the best interests of clients requires gathering enough information from the client and giving appropriate advice.
• s 961G: Appropriate advice duty
  The advice must be appropriate to the client, having regard to their circumstances. Central to ‘appropriateness’ is that the client has been provided information to understand the recommendation.
• s 961H: Warning if advice incomplete
  Requires a warning if the advice is based on incomplete or inaccurate information. This supports the idea that clients must understand any limitations of the advice before they can rely on it.
• s 961J – Conflicts priority rule
  Requires advisers to prioritise the client’s interests over their own when conflicts exist. Numerous cases (including the recent Count class action^[7]) show that courts will only find conflicts defensible if clients have given informed consent.

Staying with the Corporations Act, s 947 – dealing with SOAs – more directly addresses the importance of disclosure (verbal and documented) that is clear, concise and effective (i.e. understandable).

ASIC summarises these specific requirements thus:

“The Corporations Act requires persons who provide financial product advice to retail clients to comply with certain conduct and disclosure obligations. These obligations are designed to ensure that retail clients receive good quality advice about financial products and are able to make informed decisions about that advice.”^[8]

ASIC guidance

The core ASIC instruments dealing with client understanding and consent are RG 175, which deals with conduct and disclosure, and Information Sheet 267, which includes an example SOA as an attachment.

In paragraph 161 of RG 175, ASIC explicitly references client comprehension as an outcome of effective disclosures:

“(d) good quality advice educates and equips clients to make informed decisions about their finances, including whether to accept and implement the strategies and products recommended to them; and

(f) good quality advice involves good communication—including SOAs and verbal communication.”^[9]

Corporations (Relevant Providers—Code of Ethics) Instrument 2023

Formerly governed by FASEA, the adviser Code of Ethics has now been embedded into the Corporations Act^[10]. The Code makes informed consent an explicit ethical duty, elevating it beyond regulatory compliance into a professional standard.

• Standard 4 requires advisers to act for a client only with the client’s free, prior and informed consent.
• Standard 5 strengthens this obligation by requiring advisers to be satisfied that the client understands the advice, including the benefits, costs, and risks of the recommended products. This shifts responsibility from the client to the adviser: it is not enough to provide disclosure; advisers must actively test for and document comprehension.
• Standard 7 requires that clients give free, prior and informed consent to all benefits received in connection with acting for them, including fees, commissions, and other forms of remuneration. This standard makes it clear that advisers must go beyond box-ticking, making sure clients know what they are paying, why, and what they are receiving in return.

AFCA Guidance on SOA adequacy and informed consent

In 2022 AFCA publicised its approach to assessing the adequacy of Statements of Advice, explicitly addressing their importance in demonstrating informed consent:

“The question of whether a retail client has given their informed consent to take up the financial firm’s advice is a critical issue in most financial advice complaints handled by AFCA.

Where this issue is raised, we will look at all of the disclosures made by the financial firm to the client. A key document is the SOA.

If the information in the SOA is not ‘clear, concise and effective’, then AFCA might find that the client did not understand the advice and the financial firm had failed to secure the client’s informed consent to take up the advice.”^[11]

To be clear, negative consent is not informed consent

The negative consent approach, which has come to light as part of the First Guardian and Shield scandal, is effectively a form of opt out, where the companies in question decided to interpret silence as consent, in this case for their superannuation to be transferred.

Such an approach is clearly inconsistent with the expectations of ASIC and AFCA, that consent is something that is actively given by the client – rather than merely being the absence of an objection – and that is evidenced and current.

Fee consents – recent changes

A special subset of the discussion around consent in advice relates specifically to life insurance remuneration and ongoing fees.

The Delivering Better Financial Outcomes (DBFO) Act introduced important changes to how advisers must manage ongoing fee arrangements and client consents. ASIC’s updated guidance¹² makes clear that advisers are still required to obtain written fee consents, but these now sit within a simplified framework designed to reduce red tape. From 1 July 2024, advisers no longer need to issue annual Fee Disclosure Statements (FDS), with the fee consent form becoming the central document that demonstrates a client’s agreement to ongoing advice fees.

In addition, ASIC has clarified that under the DBFO changes, informed consent requirements extend beyond ongoing fees to certain insurance commissions. New FAQs released by ASIC – via INFO 292¹³ – highlight that advisers must obtain a client’s informed consent before receiving conflicted remuneration in the form of insurance commissions, even where exceptions still allow commissions under the law. According to ASIC, ‘informed’ means the client must actively understand the nature of the commission, its impact, and available alternatives before the adviser can lawfully receive it.

Areas of elevated concern and challenge

Evolving demographic and cultural trends, along with the rapid technological change, has created new areas of concern with regards to client consent.

Certain individuals and groups are at heightened risk of the ‘information asymmetry’ that informed consent is intended to correct. These include people who are vulnerable because of their lack of education or poor physical and/or mental health. Clients without a competency in English (around 5% of the population in capital cities¹⁴) are also naturally disadvantaged by the advice process, with disclosure documents rarely translated into other languages.

In both cases, advisers must be extra vigilant around gaining and documenting this consent. Calling on interpreters, having core advice documents translated, and teach-backs (where clients are asked to explain the recommendations back in their own words) are all relevant strategies in these circumstances.

Technology brings its own challenges too. With the majority of client meetings now virtual, advisers may find it harder to judge the non-verbal cues that indicated whether client comprehension is present – or lacking. Recordings, transcripts, and pre-confirmation summaries can all be used to check and document client understanding.

An even bigger technological disruption is of course the rise of Artificial Intelligence, and the issue of clients consenting to advisers using AI has been debated hotly in recent times.

The compliance risks presented by the use of AI include lack of consent over client conversations being recorded, having the data used in a third-party system, along with storage security. This prompted one compliance expert to argue that gaining informed consent from clients when using AI in the advice process is essential, and “advisers could risk a breach of the Code of Ethics if they don’t”^[15].

Assured Support managing director Sean Graham takes a different stance, arguing that rather than seeking consent, advisers should not use client data in AI systems. “At the end of the day you’re a trustee of that information and we know there is no absolutely safe repository of information,” Graham says.

“Whether it’s free or the paid version I would still not use personal information. The downside far outweighs the upside. I’m just naturally conservative about this because we’ve seen so many data breaches over the past couple of years.”^[16]

Practical ways to achieve and evidence informed consent

For advisers, the key to informed consent is not only securing agreement but also being able to demonstrate that the client understood the advice.

A best practice framework might include:

• Simplified communication
  • Use plain-language one-page SOA/ROA summaries (what, why, costs, risks, alternatives).
  • Apply the teach-back method: ask clients to restate advice in their own words; document this in file notes.
• Capture affirmative consent
  • Signed SOAs/ROAs, fee consents, and insurance consents.
  • Back up with contemporaneous records: meeting notes, recorded confirmations, or client acknowledgement emails.
• Support vulnerable or non-English speaking clients
  • Use interpreters or translated docs.
  • Offer follow-up calls to confirm understanding.
• Leverage digital tools carefully
  • Use screen-sharing, transcripts, or recordings to evidence comprehension.
  • Ensure privacy and data security when storing records.
• Systemise compliance
  • Diarise fee consent renewal dates.
  • Send reminders with clear “accept/decline” options.
  • Cross-check trustee requirements (requirements may differ across funds).
  • Provide post-advice confirmation letters outlining actions taken and complaints pathways.

In short, consent must be affirmative (proactive), current, and specific, never implied or assumed.

Conclusion

Informed consent should not be a compliance-led afterthought, it is the cornerstone of advice that is both compliant and genuinely valued by clients. As recent case studies and regulatory guidance show, disclosure alone is insufficient. Advisers must go further, ensuring that clients actively understand the advice, the risks and costs involved, and the associated remuneration structures. When advisers achieve this, they not only meet fulfilling the obligations and expectations set out by the Corporations Act, ASIC, AFCA, and the Code of Ethics, but they also protect their clients from harm and themselves from disputes.

Ultimately, the credibility of the advice industry depends on treating informed consent as the hallmark of professionalism rather than a compliance box to be ticked. Advisers who embed clear communication, affirmative consent practices, and robust record-keeping into everyday workflows will build stronger, more trusting client relationships.

Take the FAAA accredited quiz to earn 0.5 CPD hour:

CPD Quiz

The following CPD quiz is accredited by the FAAA at 0.5 hour.

Legislated CPD Area: Regulatory Compliance & Consumer Protection (0.5 hrs)

ASIC Knowledge Requirements: Regulatory Environment (0.5 hrs)

please log in to start this quiz

———–

References:
[1] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2025-releases/25-184mr-asic-takes-further-action-against-ferras-merhi-over-first-guardian-and-shield-superannuation-advice/
[2] https://www.ifa.com.au/news/36060-bring-liability-closer-how-individual-licensing-could-help-limit-advice-fallout
[3] https://www.afca.org.au/sites/default/files/2019-12/determination-495186.pdf
[4] https://my.afca.org.au/searchpublisheddecisions/kb-article/?id=ced15f99-53cd-ef11-b8e8-00224893f91b
[5] https://www.adviservoice.com.au/2015/11/elder-abuse-planners-need-to-recognise-the-warning-signs/
[6] https://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s961b.html
[7] https://www.ifa.com.au/news/35835-count-class-action-decision-a-warning-for-advisers-says-legal-expert
[8] https://download.asic.gov.au/media/pqpe0hwc/rg175-published-21-november-2024-20241219.pdf
[9] Ibid.
[10] https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2019L00117/latest/text
[11] https://www.afca.org.au/media/304/download
[12] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/news-items/asic-releases-new-and-updated-guidance-in-response-to-the-dbfo-act/
[13] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/giving-financial-product-advice/faqs-informed-consents-for-insurance-commissions/
[14] https://profile.id.com.au/australia/speaks-english
[15] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2024/10/lack-of-informed-client-consent-for-ai-creates-code-conundrum/

The post CPD: Informed consent – when disclosure becomes true understanding appeared first on AdviserVoice.

What’s shaping compliance in FY25/26 — ASIC enforcement trends, looming regulatory deadlines, and media commentary.

Introduction

For financial advisers in Australia, maintaining ongoing compliance is not only about avoiding penalties—it’s fundamental to preserving client trust, practice continuity, and professional standing. FY 2025/26 is shaping up as a period of heightened scrutiny, with looming deadlines, and a flurry of recent actions suggesting ASIC are increasingly willing to test matters in court.

ASIC’s Financial Advice Update, released in August 2025^[1], touches on several topics in their sights – including adviser registration, ongoing fee consents, breach reporting transparency, and cybersecurity – and provides advisers with a concrete roadmap of what best practice does and doesn’t look like.  Advisers who read these signals and integrate them into everyday workflows will be best placed to protect clients and keep the regulator away from their door.

In the rear-view mirror – ASIC enforcement actions since 1^st January to 31^st July 2025

The first half of 2025 has seen ASIC extremely active, with over 25 enforcement actions against advisers and licensees, categorised as follows^[2]:

• inappropriate/non-compliant advice 33.3%
• fraud/theft 23.8%
• other regulatory breaches and serious misconduct 23.8%
• unregistered financial advice 9.5%
• cybersecurity failures 4.8%
• product misrepresentation/misleading conduct 4.8%.

The themes present in many of these actions are instructive about ASIC’s focus over the near term and form the basis of the following tips for keeping ASIC happy in FY 2025/26.

1. Ongoing fee consents: what changed, what was waived, what must still be reported

DBFO tranche 1 saw the introduction of new fee consent requirements, which took effect from 10 January 2025. While intended to streamline arrangements (by replacing FDSs and renewals, with a single, consolidated written consent), their introduction actually caused a great deal of confusion and adviser angst, mainly due to the requirement for these ‘OFA’ consents to include an account identifier/number. In response to industry feedback, ASIC granted a limited no‑action position for consents missing the account number between 10 January and 5 September 2025, provided advisers obtained a compliant fresh consent.

Crucially, ASIC’s no‑action stance did not mean non-compliant OFAs didn’t need to be reported. As industry coverage has made clear, licensees may still need to lodge reportable situations where deficient consents were used:

“Communication to its members by the Financial Advice Association Australia, seen by Professional Planner, says the regulator confirmed to the association that any consent forms previously signed without an account number must be reported to ASIC as a breach.”^[4]

At the time of publishing, ASIC had not wavered from this hard – September 5 – deadline. Advisers must therefore be aware that, despite considerable pushback from the FAAA and others^[4], OFAs that do not include account numbers are non-compliant.

2. January 2026: Check your qualifications and your ASIC register entry

Most advisers will be aware of the looming January 1^st deadline to be appropriately qualified to provide personal financial advice. Ahead of this major milestone, ASIC conducted another spot check of the Financial Adviser Register (FAR), following which they issued another reminder(warning) to advisers and licensees to check the accuracy of their own entries on the (FAR). Inaccurate or incomplete information, particularly around approved qualifications and pathway eligibility, remains a live concern, and it is likely that many of the problems ASIC found in their previous spot check^[5] (in 2024) persist. Common errors identified then included:

• some of the qualifications marked as ‘approved’ did not accurately match the wording of the course in the Corporations (Relevant Providers Degrees, Qualifications and Courses Standard) Determination 2021
• some of the qualifications marked as ‘approved’ were not approved qualifications, they were professional designations (e.g. ‘Certified Financial Planner’)
• some of the qualifications marked as ‘approved’ were not, in isolation, approved qualifications, they were bridging courses. These may be listed in the Determination but are required to be coupled with another qualification to meet the requirements of the professional standard, and
• some of the qualifications marked as ‘approved’ were not approved qualifications under the Determination (examples include: the Financial Adviser Exam, Australian Qualifications Framework 1-5 qualifications, and Regulatory Guide 146 training/qualifications).

To further help advisers, ASIC recently released a dataset^[6] which shows if an AFS licensee has notified ASIC that a relevant provider has made a declaration that they are relying on the experienced provider pathway to meet the qualifications standard and the date the relevant provider passed the exam.

3. Provide personal advice only if you’re registered

Several experienced, professional advisers have been caught out by the need to be registered (as opposed to ‘authorised’), and 2025 has seen ASIC issue multiple infringement notices to advisers falling foul of this ‘clunky double-up’ requirement. On 8 April 2025, three licensees paid penalties for authorising advisers who gave personal advice while unregistered; on 17 July 2025, ASIC reported further infringement notices to two licensees for the same behaviour. One adviser was so shocked at the penalty – which exceeded $30,000 – for his honest mistake, he intentionally drew attention to the matter through the media^[7], and advisers should take heed of the lesson he learned.

Registration confirms minimum competency and fitness; advising without it undermines informed consent and creates remediation risk if advice later proves defective.

4.  Treat AFCA determinations like court orders that must be acted on

Recent ASIC action has made clear that payments due as a result of AFCA determinations are not optional, or indicative, they are ultimately legally enforceable and can result in cancellation of AFS licences.

This played out recently when a firm failed to pay a determination, forcing the Compensation Scheme of Last Resort (CSLR) to step in and pay the determined amount ($21,888.20). Payments from the CSLR automatically trigger licence cancellation, which is exactly what ASIC did in April 2025^[8].

The firm was also ordered to remain a member of AFCA for a period of 12 months, ending on 29 April 2026.

5. Cybersecurity: advisers and licensees in the crosshairs

Financial advisers are regulated under the Corporations Act s912A licence obligations, which ASIC has enforced in court as requiring adequate cyber risk and governance systems. The latest demonstration of this was seen in July 2025, when they commenced proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court against a high-profile licensee, alleging failure to adequately manage cybersecurity risks across its advice network^[9].

Often an afterthought in smaller practices – either through lack of understanding or lack of priority – it is clear even smaller advice businesses must be able to evidence cyber governance, training, and incident readiness.

Cyber incidents compromise confidentiality and can enable fraud. Financial advisers, who deal with highly sensitive financial and personal data from their clients, are an obvious target for cyber criminals. Good cyber hygiene directly protects client data and assets.

6. Learn from the First Guardian/Shield collapse

It has been hard to avoid recent media coverage of the First Guardian and Shield master funds’ failures, which exposed thousands of investors to losses^[10]. This collapse has seen ASIC step up their scrutiny of platform trustees and distribution arrangements.

For advisers, the lesson is pre‑emptive, there are several ‘red flags’ that should have been heeded, including:

• rapid capital influx into obscure and/or illiquid schemes
• use of high-pressure sales tactics and referral models pushing super rollovers and advice funnels
• opaque governance and valuation practices, including significant related-party dealings and offshore transfers.

7. Correcting clients who have been ‘finfluenced’

ASIC has repeatedly warned about unlicensed financial advice via social media^[11]. Even when enforcement targets ‘finfluencers’, advisers face the downstream risks: clients arrive primed with misinformation and unrealistic expectations, making the concept of informed consent even more critical. The question “What have you read or watched lately?” should almost be seen as a standing agenda item, and advisers should feel free to reference the various ASIC actions against unlicensed finfluencers and other non-compliant peddlers of misinformation

8.  Beware the ‘cookie‑cutter’: personalisation is being enforced

‘Cookie-cutter’ advice – generic, templated financial advice that is not tailored to an individual client’s circumstances – has attracted significant focus from ASIC and AFCA over the last 12 months. Advice that is not personalised to a client’s ‘objectives, financial situation and needs’ fails to meet the Best Interests Duty (BID) under law, and ASIC have wasted little time in acting. Recent cases successfully prosecuted run the gamut from SMSF/property advice, life insurance, and superannuation rollovers, to unbalanced ‘one size fits all’ portfolios.

In one high profile case, the Federal Court imposed a penalty of $11 million on a financial services provider for cookie‑cutter superannuation advice influenced by conflicted bonus payments^[12].

AFCA has previously referenced^[13] how they have seen batches of disputes where the same SOA was used for every single client, and what a massive red flag this represents.

For the average, compliant, adviser, the lesson here is perhaps a nuanced one. The desire for simplification and efficiency often involves the use of templated documents and processes. To an extent, model portfolios are also templates. These are not problematic unless they result in advice which is also templated, rather than personalised.

Summary

While none of ASIC’s current focus areas should come as a surprise, advisers – especially those who also manage a practice – ought to be forgiven if specific complexities and nuances of everchanging regulatory requirements fall through the cracks. Sadly, ASIC is not always as generous, and as their various actions taken already in 2025 demonstrate, their antennae is raised on several fronts

By interpreting the signals ASIC continues to send – through the media and through its own website – advisers can get a clear picture about where to focus their attention. Although not an exhaustive list, the steps suggested in this article are a solid platform on which to build a practice that better protects its clients, and for which ASIC has less reason to knock.

Take the FAAA accredited quiz to earn 0.5 CPD hour:

CPD Quiz

The following CPD quiz is accredited by the FAAA at 0.5 hour.

Legislated CPD Area: Regulatory Compliance & Consumer Protection (0.5 hrs)

ASIC Knowledge Requirements: Regulatory Environment (0.5 hrs)

please log in to start this quiz

———–

References:
[1] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/news-items/financial-advice-update-august-2025/
[2] Ibid.
[3] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2025/07/asic-still-expects-breach-reports-despite-no-action-on-fee-consent/
[4] https://www.ifa.com.au/news/36094-fee-consent-technical-flaw-causing-angst-for-advisers
[5] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2024-releases/24-142mr-asic-urges-afs-licensees-to-correct-records-on-the-financial-advisers-register/
[6] https://www.asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/financial-advice/professional-standards/providing-tax-financial-advice-services/
[7] https://www.ifa.com.au/news/36007-how-asic-s-clunky-double-up-registration-process-punishes-honest-mistakes
[8] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2025-releases/25-067mr-asic-cancels-licence-of-brite-advisors-pty-ltd/
[9] https://www.moneymanagement.com.au/news/financial-planning/asic-sues-fortnum-private-wealth-over-alleged-cyber-security-breach
[10] https://www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/compensation-for-first-guardian-shield-victims-may-be-a-third-of-1b-loss-20250716-p5mf9b
[11] https://www.ifa.com.au/news/35844-asic-puts-finfluencers-in-the-crosshairs-over-unlicensed-financial-advice
[12] https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2025-releases/25-063mr-financial-services-provider-penalised-11-million-over-cookie-cutter-advice-and-conflicted-bonus-payments/#:~:text=DOD%20Bookkeeping%20Pty%20Ltd%20,provided%20inappropriate%20%E2%80%9Ccookie%20cutter%E2%80%9D%20advice
[13] https://www.professionalplanner.com.au/2023/06/simpler-dealing-with-banks-than-smaller-licensees/#:~:text=in%20planning%20in%202008%2C%20I,%E2%80%9D

The post CPD: How to keep ASIC happy – FY 2025/26 edition appeared first on AdviserVoice.